Prof. Dr. Daniel Krähmer
Universität
Bonn
Institut für Mikroökonomik
Adenauer Allee
24-42
D-53113 Bonn,
Germany
++49-(0)228-736147
kraehmer[at]hcm.uni-bonn.de
Office: Lennestr. 43, 2. OG
Office hours: by appointment
I
am a microeconomic theorist interested in Information Economics
and Game Theory, especially Mechanism and Information design,
Contract theory, IO, and Behavioral Economics.
Working papers
Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy, with Roland Strausz.
Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility, with Roland Strausz.
Publications
Biased Beliefs in Search Markets, with Tobias Gamp.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15, 2023, 414-464.Optimal Non-linear Pricing with Data-sensitive Consumers, with Roland Strausz.
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15, 2023, 80-108.Competition in Search Markets with Naïve Consumers, with Tobias Gamp.
Rand Journal of Economics, 53, 2022, 356-385.Information Design and Strategic Communication.
American Economic Review: Insights, 3, 2021, 51-66.Information Disclosure and Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design.
Journal of Economic Theory, 107, 2020, 105020.Sequential versus Static Screening – An Equivalence Result, with Roland Strausz.
Games and Economic Behavior 106, 2017, 317-328.The Optimal Allocation of Decision and Exit Rights in Organizations, with Helmut Bester.
Rand Journal of Economics 48, 2017, 309-334.Optimal Sequential Delegation, with Eugen Kovac.
Journal of Economic Theory 163, 2016, 849-888.Optimality of Sequential Screening with Multiple Units and Ex Post Participation Constraints, with Roland Strausz.
Economics Letters 142, 2016, 64-68.Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening, with Roland Strausz.
Games and Economic Behavior 90, 2015, 257-273.Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights, with Roland Strausz.
Review of Economic Studies 82, 2015, 762-790.When are Signals Complements or Substitutes?, with Tilman Börgers and Angel Hernando-Veciana.
Journal of Economic Theory 148, 2013, 165-195.Anticipated Regret as an Explanation of Uncertainty Aversion, with Rebecca Stone.
Economic Theory 25, 2013, 709-728.Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information, with Helmut Bester.
Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 1947-1968.Optimal Auction Design with Endogenously Correlated Buyer Types.
Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 118-141.Comment on Correlated information, mechanism design and information, with Roland Strausz.
Journal of Economic Theory 146, 2011, 2159-2164.Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning, with Roland Strausz.
Review of Economic Studies 78, 2011, 1015-1041.
Delegation and Incentives, with Helmut Bester.
Rand Journal of Economics 39, 2008, 664-682.
Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening, with Roland Strausz.
B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 8:1 (Topics), Article 25, 2008.Equilibrium Learning in Simple Contests.
Games and Economic Behavior 59, 2007,105-131.VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities, with Roland Strausz.
Economics Letters 94 (2), 2007, 192-196.Advertising and Conspicuous Consumption.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 162 (4), 2006, 661-682.Message-Contingent Delegation.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60 (4), 2006, 490-506.Entry and Experimentation in Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 21 (8), 2003 1201-1213.
Book chapter and reviews
``Dynamic Mechanism Design'', with Roland Strausz. Chapter 11 in: Tilman Börgers: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Comment on ``Standardization as a Solution to the Reading Costs of Form Contracts''
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 167, 2011, 45-48.Bacharach, M.: Beyond Individual Choice. Teams and Frames in Game Theory.
Journal of Economics, 91, 2007, 299-304.