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Optimal Information Disclosure

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A sender randomly draws a “prospect” characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect’s relevance exceeds his opportunity cost. The sender’s profits are typically maximized by partial information disclosure, whereby the receiver is induced to accept less relevant but more profitable prospects (“switches”) by pooling them with more relevant but less profitable ones (“baits”). Extensions include maximizing a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus and allowing the sender to use monetary incentives.

I. Introduction

An Internet advertising platform can provide some information to users about the relevance of its ads. This information can be signaled by such features as the ads’ positions on the Web page, their font size, color, use of flashing, and so forth. Suppose that users have rational expectations and are sophisticated enough to interpret these signals. Then

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user welfare would be maximized by communicating the ads' relevance to them, thus allowing fully informed decisions about which ads to click.

The platform, however, may care not just about user welfare but also about its own profits. Suppose that each potential ad is characterized by its value to consumers and its per-click profits to the platform, and the two are not always aligned. Then the platform would increase its profits by inducing users to click on more profitable ads. While the platform would not be able to fool rational users systematically to induce them to click more on less relevant ads, a similar effect could be achieved by withholding some information from them, pooling the less relevant but more profitable ads with those that are more relevant and less profitable.

Similar information disclosure problems arise in other economic settings. For example, a bond rating agency chooses what information to disclose to investors about bond issuers, who also make payments to the agency for the rating. Likewise, a school chooses what information to disclose to prospective employers about the ability of its students, who also pay tuition to the school. In these cases, the profit-maximizing disclosure rule may be partially but not fully revealing.

This paper characterizes the optimal disclosure rule in a simple stylized version of such settings. Our basic model has two agents: the "sender" and the "receiver." The sender (who can be alternatively interpreted as an advertising platform, rating agency, or school) has a probability distribution over "prospects" (ads, bonds, or students, respectively). Each prospect is characterized by its profitability to the sender and its value to the receiver (user, investor, or employer), which are not observed by the receiver. First, the sender commits to an information disclosure rule about the prospects. Next, a prospect is drawn at random, and a signal about it is shown to the receiver according to the rule. The receiver then makes a rational inference about the prospect's value from the disclosed signal and chooses whether to accept the prospect (click on the ad, invest in the bond, hire the student) or to reject it.

The problem of designing the optimal disclosure rule turns out to be amenable to elegant analysis under the special assumption that the receiver's private reservation value (or opportunity cost of accepting a prospect) is drawn from a uniform distribution, with support normalized to the interval $[0,1]$. In this case, the probability of the receiver accepting a prospect simply equals his expectation of its value. For convenience, we also assume that the distribution from which prospects are drawn is finite valued and that the sender can randomize in sending signals.¹

¹ We believe that such randomization would become unnecessary with a continuous, convex-support distribution of prospects, but the full analysis of such a case is considerably more challenging.

Under these assumptions, we characterize the optimal rule. In particular, we establish that this rule must have the following properties:

- It is potentially optimal to pool two prospects (i.e., send the same signal for each of them with a positive probability) when they are “unordered” (i.e., one has a higher profit and a lower value than the other). When two prospects are “ordered” (i.e., one dominates the other in both profit and value), it is never optimal to pool them.
- When we describe each signal shown to the receiver by the prospect’s expected profit and expected value conditional on the signal, the set of such signals must be ordered; that is, for any two signals, one must dominate the other in both value and profit.
- Any set of prospects that are pooled with each other (i.e., result in the same signal) with a positive probability must lie on a straight line in the profit-value space. For the “generic” case in which no three prospects are on the same line, this implies that any signal can pool at most two prospects.
- Two line segments connecting pooled prospects cannot intersect in the profit-value space.
- When one prospect is higher than another in both value and profit, it can be pooled only into a higher signal than the other.
- In the “generic” case, the set of prospects can be partitioned into three subsets—“bait” prospects, “switch” prospects, and “isolated” prospects—so that any possible pooling involves one bait prospect and one switch prospect, with the switch prospect having a higher profit and a lower value than the bait prospect it is pooled with. Each bait or switch prospect is pooled with other prospects with probability one, whereas each isolated prospect is never pooled.

While these results tell us a great deal about the optimal disclosure mechanism, they do not fully describe it: they still leave many ways to choose the pooling partners of a given prospect and the probabilities with which this prospect is pooled with its partners. Fortunately, the sender’s expected profit-maximization problem for these pooling probabilities turns out to have a concave objective function and linear constraints (i.e., that the probabilities add up to one). Its solution can then be characterized by first-order conditions, which we derive.

In the general analysis we take the profitability of each prospect to the sender as given. Yet we can apply this analysis to scenarios in which the sender is an intermediary between the receiver and an independent advertiser who owns the prospect. The sender’s mechanism design problem then includes the design of payments that the advertiser is charged for the signal about his prospect that is shown to the receiver. For example, an online advertising platform charges advertisers different

payments for different signals (such as ad placement). In the extreme case in which the sender has full information about the advertiser's profits, the sender can charge him payments that extract these profits fully, in which case the disclosure design problem becomes the same as if the sender owned the prospects. But we also consider the more interesting case in which the advertiser has private information about the prospects' profitability to him. For example, online advertisers may have private information about their per-click profits, and so any mechanism designed by the platform will leave advertisers with some information rents. By subtracting these rents from the total profits, we can calculate the profits collected by the platform as the advertiser's "virtual profits," which is the part of his profits that can be appropriated by the platform.

We consider an application in which the advertiser's private information is his per-click profit θ . In addition, there is a signal ρ of the advertiser's relevance for the receiver that is observed by both the sender and the advertiser. The prospect's value for the receiver is given by a function $v(\theta, \rho)$, which allows for the advertiser's private information to affect this value. The sender (e.g., an advertising platform) offers a mechanism to the advertiser, which without loss can be a direct revelation mechanism: the advertiser reports his profits θ (e.g., through his bid per click), which together with the relevance parameter ρ determines the probability distribution over the signals revealed to the receiver about the prospect as well as the advertiser's payment to the sender. Through an example, we argue that this model may help account for some simple stylized features of Internet advertising.

We also consider a few extensions of the model. First, we study the more general problem of finding Pareto-optimal disclosure rules that maximize a weighted sum of sender profits and receiver surplus rather than maximizing sender profits alone. This problem is relevant, for example, if the sender faces competition from other platforms to attract consumers. In this case, we would expect the sender to place a positive weight on consumer surplus in order to expand her market share, with a larger weight representing more intense competition. We show that this problem is mathematically equivalent to the original problem upon a linear change of coordinates. As the Pareto weight on consumer surplus increases (e.g., platforms become closer competitors), the optimal rule eventually becomes fully revealing.²

² We do not consider *two-sided* competition, in which intermediary platforms compete for advertisers as well as for consumers. In such a setting, the impact of competition on information disclosure is likely to depend on the market arrangement. For example, the literature on two-sided competition (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006) shows that if advertisers "multi-home" (i.e., purchase ads on multiple platforms simultaneously), it is possible that competition favors only consumers. In contrast, if advertisers "single-home" (such as students attending a single college), their profits normally increase with competition, potentially at the expense of consumers. While

Second, as noted above, we have assumed that the receiver has a uniformly distributed private reservation value. This is a very special distributional assumption (although similar assumptions have proven necessary to obtain tractable results in other communication models, such as Crawford and Sobel [1982] and Athey and Ellison [2008]). When the reservation value is drawn from a nonlinear cumulative distribution function (cdf) G , the desirability to pool any two prospects inevitably depends on the specific shape of this function, and therefore much less can be said in general. We show, however, that some of our basic characterizations extend to this case.

Finally, we allow the sender to offer monetary transfers (subsidies or taxes) conditional on the receiver accepting the prospect. For example, the sender could be a seller who sets the price of her product in addition to disclosing information. We find that given the optimal choice of transfers, it becomes optimal to have a fully revealing disclosure rule (regardless of how the receiver's reservation value is distributed). In this case, the receiver can be induced to accept low-value/high-profit prospects using direct monetary incentives, and the original motivation for pooling them with high-value/low-profit prospects disappears.

II. Related Literature

There exists a large literature on communicating information in sender-receiver games: using costly signals such as education (Spence 1973) or advertising (Nelson 1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984), disclosure of verifiable information (see Milgrom [2008] for a survey), or cheap talk (Crawford and Sobel 1982). Our approach is distinct from this literature in two key respects: (1) our sender is able to commit to a disclosure rule (thus, formally, we consider the Stackelberg equilibrium rather than the Nash equilibrium of the game), and (2) our sender has two-dimensional rather than one-dimensional private information. These differences fundamentally alter the disclosure outcomes.

We believe that commitment to an information disclosure rule is a sensible assumption in the applications discussed in the introduction. We can view the sender as a "long-run" player facing a sequence of "short-run" receivers. In such a repeated game, a patient long-run player will be able to develop the reputation for playing his Stackelberg strategy, provided that enough information is revealed concerning the history of play (Fudenberg and Levine 1989). While an Internet advertising

this literature abstracts from information disclosure, its findings suggest that market configurations that benefit consumers will increase transparency, whereas configurations favoring advertisers (who potentially benefit from concealing information) may have the opposite effect. (See also Hagiu and Jullien [2010] for a related discussion in the context of consumer search.)

platform may be tempted in the short run to fool users into clicking more on profitable ads by overstating their relevance, pursuing this strategy would be detrimental to the platform's long-run profits.³

There exists a substantial literature on the optimal disclosure policy for a monopolistic seller-auctioneer (e.g., Milgrom and Weber 1982; Lewis and Sappington 1994; Ottaviani and Prat 2001; Ganuza 2004; Calzolari and Pavan 2006; Johnson and Myatt 2006; Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007; Esö and Szentes 2007; Board 2009; Ganuza and Pen-alva 2010). In this literature, the seller's decision to disclose information is determined by a trade-off between its impact on the total surplus and its impact on the buyers' information rents. Because of this trade-off, full disclosure is not always optimal. The insights of our basic model are driven by different forces, since the sender cannot extract any receiver rents using prices. However, when the sender uses optimal signal-contingent prices, full disclosure becomes optimal despite the fact that the sender cannot extract all information rents. This result is related to the findings of Ottaviani and Prat (2001) and Esö and Szentes (2007), as we discuss in Section VIII.C.

Pooling information about two prospects may be interpreted as "bundling" them together since it forces the receiver to accept both of them or none. Under this interpretation, our model is related to the literature on bundling (e.g., Stigler 1968; Adams and Yellen 1976; McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston 1989). One difference from this literature is again the sender's inability to extract surplus using prices. Another difference is that we assume that the receiver has no private information about the relative value of different prospects. In contrast, this literature has shown bundling to be optimal when the buyer has sufficient private information about his relative value for different goods (i.e., his values for different goods are not too positively correlated).

Another related literature is that on certification intermediaries, starting with Lizzeri (1999). In Lizzeri's basic model, the certification intermediary is able to capture the whole surplus by revealing either no information or just enough information for consumers to make efficient choices. The key features distinguishing our model from this literature are the two-dimensional space of prospects and lack of price flexibility, which lead to partial information disclosure and partial pooling in specific directions. Adding price flexibility to our model (as considered in Sec. VIII.C) could make it more appropriate for some applications.

Our model is also related to that of Rayo (2010), who examines the optimal mechanism for selling conspicuous goods whose main purpose

³ If the sender lacked commitment power, she would be unable to credibly separate any two prospects (with positive profits) unless they happened to deliver exactly the same value for the receiver, since the sender would rather pretend to have the more valuable prospect leading to a higher probability of acceptance.

is assumed to be signaling of wealth. This is parallel to our model once we interpret the seller as the sender, consumers as prospects, and conspicuous goods as signals. The main difference from our model is again in the dimension of the type space: the type in Rayo's model is one-dimensional, and prospects/consumers who have a higher value are also the ones for whom signaling a higher type is more profitable.

Kamenica and Gentzkow (2009) and Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2008) consider games in which a sender with commitment power influences a rational receiver through her choice of information disclosure. Kamenica and Gentzkow find general conditions under which such influence is desirable for the sender, whereas Ostrovsky and Schwarz study the equilibrium disclosure in matching markets. In contrast to these papers, we offer a detailed characterization of the optimal rule for the case in which the sender's information is two-dimensional and the receiver's opportunity cost is private information.

Athey and Ellison (2008) and Hagiu and Jullien (2010) consider an intermediary platform's placement of sellers (or their ads) when consumers search among sellers sequentially and face a search cost.⁴ While these papers do not consider general information disclosure mechanisms, the placement of a seller conveys information about his value to consumers. Athey and Ellison focus on one-dimensional seller types, so that the more profitable sellers also have higher quality, and show that the platform optimally orders sellers according to their quality. Hagiu and Jullien instead consider two sellers and allow the higher-value seller to be potentially less profitable to the platform. They show that the intermediary might gain from "diverting" search, that is, forcing consumers to visit the low-value seller before gaining access to the high-value one. This strategy is related to the pooling strategy in our model in the sense that the high-value seller is used as bait to increase demand for the low-value seller (although our pooling strategy is more elaborate as we consider an arbitrary number of prospects). Hagiu and Jullien also study how the placement of sellers affects their equilibrium choice of prices, which we do not consider.

III. Setup

We begin with two players: the sender and the receiver. The sender is endowed with a prospect, which is randomly drawn from a finite set $P = \{1, \dots, N\}$. The probability of prospect i being realized is denoted by $p_i > 0$, with $\sum_{i \in P} p_i = 1$. Each prospect $i \in P$ is characterized by its

⁴ See also Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) for a related search model in which a platform can credibly communicate that a product is high quality by making it prominent.

payoffs $(\pi_i, v_i) \in \mathbb{R}^2$, where π_i is the prospect's profitability to the sender and v_i is its value to the receiver.

The realized prospect is not directly observed by the receiver. Instead, the receiver is shown a signal s about this prospect according to an information disclosure rule defined as follows.⁵

DEFINITION 1. A "disclosure rule" $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$ consists of a finite set S of signals and a mapping $\sigma: P \rightarrow \Delta(S)$ that assigns to each prospect i a probability distribution $\sigma(i) \in \Delta(S)$ over signals.⁶

For example, at one extreme, the *full separation* rule is implemented by taking the signal space $S = P$ and the disclosure rule $\sigma_s(i) = 1$ if $s = i$ and $\sigma_s(i) = 0$ otherwise. At the other extreme, the *full pooling* rule is implemented by letting S be a singleton.

After observing the signal s , the receiver, who has knowledge of the disclosure rule, decides whether to "accept" ($a = 1$) or "not accept" ($a = 0$) the prospect. Whenever the receiver accepts the prospect, he forgoes an outside option worth r , which is a random variable independent of i drawn from a cdf G over $[0, 1]$. Thus, the sender and receiver obtain payoffs, respectively, equal to $a\pi$ and $a(v - r)$.

We assume that the sender commits to a disclosure rule before the prospect is realized. Thus, the timing is as follows:

1. The sender chooses a disclosure rule $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$, which is observed by the receiver.
2. A prospect $i \in P$ is drawn.
3. A signal $s \in S$ is drawn from distribution $\sigma(i)$ and shown to the receiver.
4. The receiver privately observes r and accepts or rejects the prospect.

EXAMPLE 1. A search engine (the sender) shows a consumer (the receiver) an online advertisement with a link. On the basis of the characteristics of this advertisement (s) and his own opportunity cost (r), the consumer decides whether or not to click on the link. The online advertisement, for instance, may describe a product sold by a separate firm, in which case the search engine's payoff (π) may correspond to a fee paid by such firm. We consider this possibility in greater detail in Section VII.

Conditional on observing signal s , the receiver optimally accepts the

⁵ In principle, the sender may be able to "exclude" a prospect (e.g., by not showing it to the receiver at all). For expositional simplicity we do not consider this possibility for the time being. Our analysis will thus apply conditional on the probability distribution of the prospects that are not excluded. (When all prospects have nonnegative profits, the sender will indeed find it optimal not to exclude any of them.) We explicitly introduce optimal exclusion decisions in Sec. V below.

⁶ The restriction to a finite set of signals is without loss of generality in this setting.

prospect if and only if his expected value conditional on this signal, $\mathbb{E}[v|s]$, is greater than or equal to r . Thus, the probability that $a = 1$ (the receiver's "acceptance rate") is given by $\text{prob}\{r \leq \mathbb{E}[v|s]\} = G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])$.

In what follows, we normalize the values of v to lie in the interval $[0, 1]$ and we assume that r is uniformly distributed over this interval. Under the uniform distribution, the acceptance rate becomes $G(\mathbb{E}[v|s]) = \mathbb{E}[v|s]$, which is linear in the posterior value $\mathbb{E}[v|s]$. As a result, the ex ante probability of acceptance $\mathbb{E}(G(\mathbb{E}[v|s]))$ (with the first expectation taken over signals) is independent of the disclosure rule:

$$\mathbb{E}(G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])) = \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[v|s]) = \mathbb{E}[v],$$

where $\mathbb{E}[v]$ is the ex ante expected value of the prospect. Thus, while the disclosure rule can change the probability with which a given prospect is accepted (e.g., a low-value prospect is accepted more often when pooled with a high-value prospect), it cannot change the average probability of acceptance across prospects.⁷

The expected surplus obtained by the receiver given signal s is

$$\int_0^1 \max\{\mathbb{E}[v|s] - r, 0\} dr = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[v|s]^2.$$

As for the sender, conditional on signal s having been sent and accepted, her expected profit is $\mathbb{E}[\pi|s]$. Hence her expected profit from sending this signal is $\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s]$. When an ex ante expectation is taken over signals, the receiver's and sender's expected payoffs for a given disclosure rule are, respectively,

$$U_R = \mathbb{E}\left(\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[v|s]^2\right), \quad (1)$$

$$U_S = \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s]). \quad (2)$$

Observe that for the purpose of computing the parties' payoffs, a disclosure rule $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$ is characterized by the total probability $q_s = \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_s(i)$ that each signal $s \in S$ is sent, as well as the parties' posterior expected payoffs conditional on each signal:

⁷ When G is nonlinear, the disclosure rule may affect the ex ante acceptance rate (e.g., $\mathbb{E}(G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])) = \mathbb{E}[G(v)]$ under full separation and $\mathbb{E}(G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])) = G(\mathbb{E}[v])$ under full pooling), which gives the sender an additional motive to reveal or conceal information depending on the curvature of G . In Sec. VIII.B we show that this additional motive may heavily affect the desirability of pooling prospects, and therefore much less can be said in general about the optimal rule (although some basic characterizations do extend to this case).

$$\mathbb{E}[v|s] = \frac{1}{q_s} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_s(i) v_i,$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] = \frac{1}{q_s} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_s(i) \pi_i.$$

Thus, showing the receiver a signal s is equivalent to showing him a single fully disclosed prospect with payoffs $(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s], \mathbb{E}[v|s])$. This observation will prove useful in analyzing optimal disclosure rules.

Note, in particular, that if we have two different signals with the same expected payoffs $(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s], \mathbb{E}[v|s])$, they can be merged into one signal with their combined probability. Thus, we can restrict attention without loss to disclosure rules that are *nonredundant*, that is, where different signals have different expected payoffs $(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s], \mathbb{E}[v|s])$, and all signals are sent with positive probabilities. We will also view different disclosure rules that coincide up to a relabeling of signals as equivalent. We can then say, for example, that there is a unique (nonredundant) full-separation rule and a unique (nonredundant) full-pooling rule.

Consider the effect of information disclosure on the two parties' payoffs. As far as the receiver is concerned, it is clear that the more information is disclosed to him, the higher his expected payoff. Thus, the receiver's expected payoff is maximized by the full-separation rule, which gives him a payoff of $\mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{2}v^2]$. One way to see this is using Jensen's inequality. Namely, for any disclosure rule,

$$\mathbb{E}(\frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}[v|s]^2) \leq \mathbb{E}(\frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}[v^2|s]) = \mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{2}v^2].$$

At the other extreme, under full pooling, the receiver's expected payoff is only $\frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}[v]^2$. Again by Jensen's inequality, this is the smallest possible payoff among all disclosure rules:

$$\frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}[v]^2 = \frac{1}{2}[\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[v|s])]^2 \leq \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[v|s]^2).$$

We now turn to the problem of choosing the disclosure rule to maximize the sender's expected payoff, which proves to be substantially more complicated and in general is not solved by either full separation or full pooling.

IV. Characterizing Profit-Maximizing Disclosure

The goal is to find a disclosure rule that maximizes the expected product of the two coordinates $\mathbb{E}[\pi|s]$ and $\mathbb{E}[v|s]$:

$$\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s]). \quad (3)$$

We begin with a simple exercise that will form a key building block for the analysis. The sender's expected gain from pooling two prospects i and j into one signal (while disclosing information about the other

prospects as before) is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (p_i + p_j) \mathbb{E}[\pi_k | k \in \{i, j\}] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v_k | k \in \{i, j\}] - p_i \pi_i v_i - p_j \pi_j v_j \\
 &= (p_i + p_j) \cdot \frac{p_i \pi_i + p_j \pi_j}{p_i + p_j} \cdot \frac{p_i v_i + p_j v_j}{p_i + p_j} - p_i \pi_i v_i - p_j \pi_j v_j \quad (4) \\
 &= -\frac{p_i p_j}{p_i + p_j} (\pi_i - \pi_j)(v_i - v_j).
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we see that the profitability of pooling two prospects depends on how their payoffs are ordered.

DEFINITION 2. Two prospects i, j are *ordered* if either $(\pi_i, v_i) \leq (\pi_j, v_j)$ or $(\pi_j, v_j) \leq (\pi_i, v_i)$. The two prospects are *unordered* if $(\pi_i, -v_i) \leq (\pi_j, -v_j)$ or $(\pi_j, -v_j) \leq (\pi_i, -v_i)$. The two prospects are *strictly ordered* if they are ordered and not unordered; they are *strictly unordered* if they are unordered and not ordered.

Examination of (4) immediately yields the following lemma.

LEMMA 1. Pooling two prospects yields (strictly) higher profits for the sender than separating them if the prospects are (strictly) unordered and yields (strictly) lower profits if the prospects are (strictly) ordered.

One intuition for this result is that pooling two prospects preserves the expected acceptance rate but shifts it from the more valuable to the less valuable prospect. When the more valuable prospect is also more profitable (the “ordered” case), this shift reduces the sender’s expected profits. When instead the more valuable prospect is less profitable (the “unordered” case), this shift raises the sender’s expected profits.

The simple observation in lemma 1 has far-reaching implications for the optimal disclosure rule with any number of prospects. The simplest one is as follows.

LEMMA 2. In a profit-maximizing disclosure rule, the set of the signals’ payoffs

$$\{(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s], \mathbb{E}[v|s]) : s \in S\}$$

is ordered (i.e., any two of its elements are ordered).

Proof. If there were two signals $s_1, s_2 \in S$ sent with positive probabilities such that $(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s_1], \mathbb{E}[v|s_1])$ and $(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s_2], \mathbb{E}[v|s_2])$ are not ordered, then by lemma 1 the expected profits would be increased by pooling these two signals into one. QED

Further characterization of the optimal rule requires the following concept.

DEFINITION 3. The *pool of signal* $s \in S$ is the set P_s of prospects for which this signal is sent with positive probability, that is,

$$P_s = \{i \in P : \sigma_s(i) > 0\}.$$

The following two lemmas significantly narrow down the type of pooling that can arise in an optimal rule. Lemma 3 tells us that multiple prospects can share a given signal only if all their payoffs lie on the same straight line.

LEMMA 3. In a profit-maximizing disclosure rule, for any given signal $s \in S$, the payoffs of the prospects in the pool of s , $\{(\pi_i, v_i) : i \in P_s\}$, lie on a straight line with a nonpositive slope.⁸

Proof. Suppose in negation that the payoffs do not lie on a straight line. Then the convex hull of $\{(\pi_i, v_i) : i \in P_s\}$, which we denote by H , has a nonempty interior, which contains $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$. Therefore, H contains $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] - (\delta, \delta)$ for a small enough $\delta > 0$; that is, there exists $\lambda \in \Delta(P_s)$ such that

$$\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] - (\delta, \delta) = \sum_{i \in P_s} \lambda_i \cdot (\pi_i, v_i).$$

Now replace the original signal s with two new signals s_1 and s_2 and consider the new disclosure rule $\hat{\sigma}$ that for each $i \in P_s$ has $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_1}(i) = \varepsilon \lambda_i$ and $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_2}(i) = p_i \sigma_s(i) - \varepsilon \lambda_i$, where $\varepsilon > 0$ is chosen small enough so that $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_2}(i) > 0$ for all $i \in P_s$. (Let $\hat{\sigma}_t(i) = \sigma_t(i)$ for all i and all $t \in S \setminus \{s\}$.) By construction, we obtain

$$\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_1] = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] - (\delta, \delta)$$

and

$$\frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_1] + \frac{q_s - \varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_2] = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s],$$

where q_s is the total mass of signal s . This in turn implies

$$\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_2] = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] + \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s - \varepsilon} (\delta, \delta).$$

Thus, the points $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_1]$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_2]$ are strictly ordered, and by lemma 1 the expected profit from separating signals s_1 and s_2 is strictly higher than the expected profit from pooling them into one signal s . This contradicts the optimality of the original disclosure rule. Finally, that the straight line containing P_s has a nonpositive slope also follows from lemma 1. QED

We illustrate our characterizations using figures in which prospects and signals are represented by balls (with the size of each ball proportional to the mass of the corresponding prospect or signal). The proof of lemma 3 is illustrated in figure 1. If a given signal pools prospects

⁸ Note that it is important for this lemma, unlike the previous results, that randomized disclosure rules be allowed. By virtue of this lemma, allowing for randomization actually simplifies the characterization of optimal disclosure, contrary to what one might expect a priori. We expect that randomization becomes superfluous when the prospects are drawn from a continuous distribution on a convex set; however, analysis of such a case requires different techniques and is not undertaken here.




FIG. 1.—Pooling along straight lines

with payoffs that do not lie on the same line (black balls), then the posterior payoffs of this signal (white ball) would belong to the interior of the convex hull of the prospects' payoffs. But this would allow the sender to split the original signal into two signals (patterned balls) with posterior payoffs that are ordered relative to each other, and since the sender's payoff increases when separating ordered prospects (lemma 1), this alternative strictly dominates the original policy.

Let the *pooling segment* of signal s denote the convex hull of the payoffs of the prospects in the pool of s . (From lemma 3, a pooling segment is contained in a straight line and therefore is a line segment.)

LEMMA 4. In a profit-maximizing disclosure rule σ , if the pooling segments of two signals do not lie on the same line, they can intersect only if they share an endpoint.

Proof. Suppose, in negation, that the pooling segments of s_1 and s_2 do not lie on the same line and yet they intersect at point x , which lies in the interior of at least one of the pooling segments. Let prospects a_1 and b_1 be the endpoints of the pooling segment of s_1 (while belonging to the pool of s_1) and let prospects a_2 and b_2 be the endpoints of the pooling segment of s_2 (while belonging to the pool of s_2). For $j = 1, 2$, let $\lambda_j \in [0, 1]$ be such that $\lambda_j(\pi_{a_j}, v_{a_j}) + (1 - \lambda_j)(\pi_{b_j}, v_{b_j}) = x$. Since $\lambda_j \in (0, 1)$ for some j , we may assume without loss that $\lambda_1 \in (0, 1)$.

Now consider a new disclosure rule $\hat{\sigma}$ that is identical to σ with the following exception: for all $j \neq k = 1, 2$,

$$p_{a_j} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(a_j) = p_{a_j} \sigma_{s_j}(a_j) - \varepsilon \lambda_j, \quad p_{b_j} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(b_j) = p_{b_j} \sigma_{s_j}(b_j) - \varepsilon(1 - \lambda_j),$$

$$p_{a_k} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(a_k) = p_{a_k} \sigma_{s_j}(a_k) + \varepsilon \lambda_k, \quad p_{b_k} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(b_k) = p_{b_k} \sigma_{s_j}(b_k) + \varepsilon(1 - \lambda_k),$$

where $\varepsilon > 0$ is chosen small enough so that $p_{a_j} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(a_j)$ and $p_{b_j} \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(b_j)$ are positive.

By construction, $\hat{\sigma}$ and σ place the same total probability on every signal. In addition, the posterior payoffs for the affected signals s_j are identical under both rules:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{\hat{\sigma}}[(\pi, v)|s_j] &= \frac{1}{q_{s_j}} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(i)(\pi_i, v_i) \\ &= \frac{1}{q_{s_j}} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_{s_j}(i)(\pi_i, v_i) - \frac{\varepsilon}{q_{s_j}} [\lambda_j(\pi_{a_j}, v_{a_j}) + (1 - \lambda_j)(\pi_{b_j}, v_{b_j})] \\ &\quad + \frac{\varepsilon}{q_{s_j}} [\lambda_k(\pi_{a_k}, v_{a_k}) + (1 - \lambda_k)(\pi_{b_k}, v_{b_k})] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{\sigma}[(\pi, v)|s_j], \end{aligned}$$

where

$$q_{s_j} = \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_{s_j}(i) = \sum_{i \in P} p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_j}(i),$$

and the last equality above follows from the fact that both expressions in brackets are equal to x .

As a result, $\hat{\sigma}$ delivers the same payoff for the sender as σ and is therefore optimal. Nevertheless, since $\lambda_1 \in (0, 1)$, the pool of signal s_2 now contains all four prospects, which is a contradiction to lemma 3. QED

The proof of lemma 4 is illustrated in figure 2. Suppose that prospects a_1 and b_1 are pooled into signal s_1 , prospects a_2 and b_2 are pooled into signal s_2 , and the corresponding pooling segments intersect at an interior point x . Since the posterior payoffs of the corresponding signals lie in the interior of the convex hull of the four prospects, the sender could have instead constructed each of the two signals using a positive mass from each of the four prospects without affecting the signals' position or total mass.⁹ Notice that this change would not affect the sender's profit. However, since the payoffs of the four prospects do not lie on a straight line, we have contradicted lemma 3.

A consequence of lemmas 2–4 is that the optimal disclosure rule is monotonic. Namely, if the payoffs of prospect i' dominate the payoffs

⁹ To achieve this, an ε mass from signal s_1 (containing a positive mass of both a_1 and b_1) can be transferred to point x (step 1) and then merged with signal s_2 (step 2), and, simultaneously, an ε mass from signal s_2 (containing a positive mass of both a_2 and b_2) can be transferred to point x (step 1') and then merged with signal s_1 (step 2').




FIG. 2.—Pooling segments do not intersect

of prospect i and it is strictly optimal to separate the two prospects from each other (i.e., their payoffs do not lie on the same horizontal or vertical line), then prospect i' is optimally assigned a higher signal than prospect i and so enjoys a higher acceptance rate.

LEMMA 5. In any optimal disclosure rule, for any two signals $s, s' \in S$ and any two distinct prospects $i \in P_s, i' \in P_{s'}$, if $(\pi_{i'}, v_{i'}) \geq (\pi_i, v_i)$, then either $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s'] \geq \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$ or it is optimal to pool the two signals.

Proof. Let $x = (\pi_i, v_i), x' = (\pi_{i'}, v_{i'}), y = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s], y' = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s']$, $L = \{\lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y | \lambda \in \mathbb{R}\}$, and $L' = \{\lambda x' + (1 - \lambda)y' | \lambda \in \mathbb{R}\}$. By lemma 2, we must have either $y' \geq y$ or $y' \leq y$. Now suppose in negation that only the second inequality holds and that it is not optimal to pool the two signals; hence $y' < y$.

By lemma 3, both L and L' must have a nonpositive slope, and since $y' < y$, we must have $L \neq L'$; hence the two lines have at most one intersection. Moreover, since $x' \geq x$ and $y' < y$, L and L' must intersect at a point C that lies in both line segments $[x, y]$ and $[x', y']$.¹⁰ But then we can find $j \in P_s$ and $j' \in P_{s'}$ such that the line segments $[x, (\pi_j, v_j)]$ and $[x', (\pi_{j'}, v_{j'})]$ (which belong to the pooling segments of s and s' , respectively) intersect at C , and this intersection occurs in the interior of at least one of the line segments because $x \neq x'$. But since we also know that the lines L and L' on which these segments lie do not coincide, this contradicts the optimality of the disclosure rule by lemma 4. QED

¹⁰ The term $[x, y] = \{\lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y | \lambda \in [0, 1]\}$.

We can further narrow down the structure of optimal pooling when we focus on the “generic” case.

DEFINITION 4. The problem is *generic* if (1) no three prospects lie on the same straight line, and (2) for all $i, j \in P$ we have $\pi_i \neq \pi_j$ and $v_i \neq v_j$.

In this case, lemma 3 tells us that no more than two prospects can share the same signal.¹¹ Thus, any given signal s either fully reveals a specific prospect i or, alternatively, pools exactly two different prospects $\{i, j\}$. Then the disclosure rule induces a “pooling graph” on P , in which two prospects are linked if and only if they are pooled into one signal. (Note that by lemma 2 it cannot be optimal to have two distinct signals that both pool the same two strictly unordered prospects, since then the two signals would themselves be strictly unordered.)

DEFINITION 5. For two prospects $i, j \in P$, if $\pi_i \geq \pi_j$ and $v_i \leq v_j$, then we say that i is “to the southeast (SE)” of j and that j is “to the northwest (NW)” of i .

PROPOSITION 1. In the generic case, an optimal disclosure rule partitions P into three subsets: the set V of “bait prospects,” the set Π of “switch prospects,” and the set I of “isolated prospects,” so that for any signal s , the pool P_s consists either of a single prospect $i \in I$ or of two prospects $\{i, j\}$ with $i \in V$ and $j \in \Pi$, with i being to the NW of j . Each bait or switch prospect is pooled with other prospects with probability one, whereas each isolated prospect is never pooled.

Proof. Observe that a given prospect i cannot be optimally pooled with a prospect i_{SE} to the SE of it and, simultaneously, with another prospect i_{NW} to the NW of it. Indeed, were this to happen, with s_{SE} and s_{NW} representing the two respective signals, the posteriors $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_{SE}]$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_{NW}]$ would be strictly unordered (here also using genericity), and so by lemma 2 this could not be an optimal rule.

Thus, for any given prospect i , there are just three possibilities: (i) it does not participate in any pools, in which case we assign i to I ; (ii) all of its pooling partners are to the SE of i , in which case we assign it to V ; and (iii) all of its pooling partners are to the NW of i , in which case we assign it to Π . Finally, note that a given bait or switch prospect i cannot be pooled with a given partner j and, simultaneously, separated with positive probability. Indeed, were this to happen, with $s = \{i, j\}$ and $s = \{i\}$ representing the two respective signals, the posteriors $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|\{i, j\}]$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|\{i\}]$ would be strictly unordered (again using genericity), and so by lemma 2 this could not be optimal. QED

Intuitively, a bait is a prospect used to attract consumers by offering

¹¹ If we instead considered a continuous distribution of prospects, then this notion of genericity would not be appropriate, and we would typically expect many prospects to be pooled into one signal.

them a high value, whereas a switch is a profitable prospect that exploits the attracted consumers. (Of course, rational consumers take the probability of being switched into account.) The substantive contribution of the proposition is in showing that the role of a pooled prospect in the optimal disclosure rule cannot change across signals: it is either always used as a bait or always used as a switch.

EXAMPLE 2 (Taxonomy of optimal pooling with four prospects). We focus on the case in which all prospects are pooled ($I = \emptyset$). The optimal pooling possibilities are as follows:

- a. $|V| = 1$ and $|\Pi| = 3$ or $|V| = 3$ and $|\Pi| = 1$: three signals (“fan”);
- b. $|V| = |\Pi| = 2$: (1) two signals, one-to-one pooling between V and Π (“two lines”); (2) three signals (“zigzag”); (3) four signals (“cycle”).

Figure 3 illustrates these possibilities (*a*, fan; *b*, two lines; *c*, zigzag; *d*, cycle). Furthermore, it turns out that cycles are “fragile”: they can be optimal only for nongeneric parameter combinations, and even for such combinations there exists another optimal pooling graph that does not contain cycles (see Sec. VI).

V. Solving for Optimal Disclosure

The results in the previous section tell us a great deal about the optimal disclosure rule but do not fully describe it. In this section we discuss how to solve for the optimal rule. For simplicity we restrict attention to the generic case in which by lemma 3 we can restrict attention to signals that either pool a pair of prospects or separate a single prospect. Thus, we can take $S = \{s \subset P: |s| = 1 \text{ or } |s| = 2\}$, where a single-element signal $\{i\}$ separates prospect i and a two-element signal $\{i, j\}$ is a pool of prospects i and j .

One way to describe such a disclosure rule is by defining, for any two-element signal $\{i, j\} \subset P$, the weight $\beta_{ij} = p_i \sigma_{\{i,j\}}(i)$ —namely, the mass of prospect i that is pooled into signal $\{i, j\}$. Given these weights, we can calculate the sender’s expected payoff (3) as follows. For each signal $\{i, j\}$ that is sent with positive probability (i.e., $\beta_{ij} + \beta_{ji} > 0$), the expected payoff from using this signal relative to that from breaking it up into separation can be obtained using formula (4) by substituting into it $p_i = \beta_{ij}$ and $p_j = \beta_{ji}$. Thus, the sender’s expected payoff can be written as

$$F(\beta) = \sum_{i \in P} p_i \pi_i v_i - \sum_{\{i,j\} \subset S} g(\beta_{ij}, \beta_{ji}) Z_{ij}, \quad (5)$$

where




FIG. 3.—Taxonomy with four prospects

$$g(a, b) = \begin{cases} ab/(a + b) & \text{if } a + b > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and

$$Z_{ij} = (\pi_i - \pi_j)(v_i - v_j) \quad \text{for all } i, j \in P$$

The sender will choose nonnegative weights to maximize this function subject to the constraints

$$\sum_{j \neq i} \beta_{ij} \leq p_i \quad \text{for all } i \in P,$$

$$\beta_{ij} \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } \{i, j\} \subset P$$

(When the first constraint holds with strict inequality for some prospect i , this means that with the remaining probability the prospect is separated.)

Furthermore, note that the sender strictly prefers not to use any signals $\{i, j\}$ for which $Z_{ij} > 0$ (i.e., for strictly ordered prospects). Thus, we can restrict attention to pools from the set

$$U = \{\{i, j\} \subset P: Z_{ij} \leq 0\}.$$

The sender’s program can then be written as

$$\max_{\beta \in \mathbb{R}^U} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \pi_i v_i - \sum_{\{i,j\} \in U} g(\beta_{ij}, \beta_{ji}) Z_{ij} \tag{6}$$

subject to

$$\sum_{j:\{i,j\} \in U} \beta_{ij} \leq p_i \quad \text{for all } i \in P, \tag{7}$$

$$\beta_{ij} \geq 0 \quad \text{for all } \{i, j\} \in U. \tag{8}$$

LEMMA 6. The objective function in (6) is continuous and concave on \mathbb{R}_+^U .

Proof. For continuity, it suffices to show that the function $g(a, b)$ is continuous on $(a, b) \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$. Continuity at any point $(a, b) \neq (0, 0)$ follows from the fact that it is a composition of continuous functions. To see continuity at $(0, 0)$, note that $g(a, b) \in [0, \min\{a, b\}]$; hence $\lim_{a,b \rightarrow +0} g(a, b) = 0 = g(0, 0)$.

For concavity, since $Z_{ij} \leq 0$ for all $\{i, j\} \in U$, it suffices to show that $g(a, b)$ is a concave function on \mathbb{R}_+^2 . We first show that it is concave on $\mathbb{R}_+^2 \setminus \{(0, 0)\}$ by expressing its Hessian at any $(a, b) \neq (0, 0)$ as

$$D^2 g(a, b) = \frac{2}{(a + b)^3} \begin{pmatrix} -b^2 & ab \\ ab & -a^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

and noting that it is negative semidefinite. Moreover, since g is continuous at $(0, 0)$, its concavity is preserved when adding this point to the domain. QED

This lemma implies that the set of solutions to the above program is convex and compact. We now proceed to write first-order conditions for this program. However, before we do so, a word of caution is in order: The function $F(\beta)$ proves nondifferentiable in (β_{ij}, β_{ji}) at points where $\beta_{ij} = \beta_{ji} = 0$. Indeed, on the one hand, the partial derivative of F with respect to either β_{ij} or β_{ji} is zero at any such point. (The reason is simply that raising one of the weights while holding the other at zero has no effect on the information disclosed to the receiver.) However, on the other hand, the directional derivative of F in any direction in which β_{ij} and β_{ji} are raised at once is not zero: in particular, it is positive when i and j are strictly unordered.

We can still make use of first-order conditions for program (6) in the variables β_{ij}, β_{ji} for signals $\{i, j\}$ such that $(\beta_{ij}, \beta_{ji}) \neq (0, 0)$, holding the set of such signals fixed at some $\hat{S} \subset U$. Letting μ_i denote the Lagrange multipliers with adding-up constraints (7), we can write the first-order

conditions as

$$\frac{\beta_{ji}^2}{(\beta_{ij} + \beta_{ji})^2} |Z_{ij}| \leq \mu_i, \quad \text{with equality if } \beta_{ij} > 0. \tag{9}$$

In particular, for signals $\{i, j\}$ and $\{i, k\}$ to both be sent with positive probabilities for prospect i , we must have

$$\frac{\beta_{ji}}{\beta_{ij} + \beta_{ji}} \sqrt{|Z_{ij}|} = \frac{\beta_{ki}}{\beta_{ik} + \beta_{ki}} \sqrt{|Z_{ik}|}.$$

Thus, one way to solve for an optimal disclosure rule is by trying different sets of signals $\hat{S} \subset U$, writing interior first-order conditions for all signals from \hat{S} to be sent with positive probabilities, solving for the optimal weights β given \hat{S} , and calculating the resulting expected profit for the sender. Then we can choose the set \hat{S} that maximizes her expected profits. In this case, we can also use proposition 1 to narrow down the set of possible signal combinations that could be optimal. Still, when the set P of prospects is large, this procedure may be infeasible since the set of possible signal combinations \hat{S} can grow exponentially with the number of prospects. For such cases, we propose an alternative approach: choose $\varepsilon > 0$ and introduce the additional constraints $\beta_{ij} + \beta_{ji} \geq \varepsilon$ for each $\{i, j\} \in U$. Within this constrained set, the objective function is totally differentiable; hence the solutions can be characterized by the respective first-order conditions. Then, by taking ε to zero, we approach a solution to the unconstrained program.

Finally, while so far we have not allowed the sender to exclude prospects (fully or partially), it is easy to introduce this possibility. Fix a prospect i . When $\pi_i \geq 0$, the sender will never strictly gain from excluding this prospect since it can always be separated from the others while delivering a nonnegative payoff. In this case, the original first-order conditions (9) for the weights β_{ij} remain valid. However, when $\pi_i < 0$, prospect i will not be included in isolation but might still be pooled with other prospects to increase their acceptance rate. Thus, the overall probability with which prospect i is included becomes $\bar{p}_i = \sum_{j:\{i,j\} \in U} \beta_{ij}$. We now substitute \bar{p}_i for p_i in the sender's objective (6) and obtain the following first-order conditions for β_{ij} :

$$\frac{\beta_{ji}^2}{(\beta_{ij} + \beta_{ji})^2} |Z_{ij}| \leq \mu_i + |\pi_i| \cdot v_i, \quad \text{with equality if } \beta_{ij} > 0, \tag{10}$$

which are identical to the original first-order conditions (9) except for the constant $|\pi_i| \cdot v_i$. This constant captures the fact that the best alternative to pooling is now to exclude the prospect rather than include it in isolation, with $|\pi_i| \cdot v_i$ representing the benefit of exclusion relative to isolation.

Conditional on any given set of signals $\hat{S} \subset U$, we obtain the optimal values of β_{ij} across all prospects by combining the original first-order

conditions (9) (for prospects such that $\pi_i \geq 0$) with the new first-order conditions (10) (for prospects such that $\pi_i < 0$), together with the complementary slackness conditions associated with the adding-up constraints (7).

VI. Cycles and Generic Uniqueness

In this section we provide a condition for the sender's problem to have an essentially unique solution. This condition also rules out the optimality of cycles (as in fig. 3d). We continue to restrict attention to the generic case.

We begin by noting that there is a trivial reason why the set of solutions to program (6), which we denote B^* , may contain multiple elements. Suppose that there is an optimum $\beta^* \in B^*$ such that for some pair $\{i, j\}$ we have $\beta_{ji}^* = 0$. In this case, $g(\beta_{ij}, \beta_{ji}^*) = 0$ for any β_{ij} , and so β_{ij} does not affect the value of the sender's objective (6). Thus, provided that the adding-up constraint (7) is slack, β_{ij} can be chosen arbitrarily.

In order to abstract from this artificial source of multiplicity, we restrict attention to the subset of optima such that

$$\beta_{ij} = 0 \Leftrightarrow \beta_{ji} = 0 \quad \text{for all } \{i, j\} \in U. \quad (11)$$

Denote this subset of optima $\hat{B} = \{\beta \in B^*: (11) \text{ holds}\}$. The following results establish properties of these optima.

LEMMA 7. The set of optima \hat{B} is convex and compact. Thus, by the Krein-Milman theorem, it is the convex hull of its vertices.

Proof. See the Appendix.

The subset \hat{B} may in principle contain two types of optima: cyclic and acyclic. (Formally, we say that β is cyclic if its pooling graph contains a cycle, namely, a set of prospects $[i_1, i_2, \dots, i_K]$, with $K > 2$, such that both $\beta_{i_k i_{(k \bmod K) + 1}}$ and $\beta_{i_{(k \bmod K) + 1} i_k}$ are strictly positive for every $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$.)¹²

LEMMA 8. An optimum $\beta \in \hat{B}$ is acyclic if and only if it is a vertex of \hat{B} .

Proof. See the Appendix.

Under a specific condition for the prospects' payoffs (which holds generically), cycles cannot arise, and, therefore, from lemmas 7 and 8, the optimum is guaranteed to be unique.

PROPOSITION 2. There exists an acyclic optimum. Moreover, if for every subset of prospects (i_1, i_2, \dots, i_K) with K even and greater than or equal to four, we have

¹² The expression $(k \bmod K)$ equals k when $k < K$ and equals zero when $k = K$.

$$\sum_{k=1}^K (-1)^k \sqrt{|Z_{i_b, k(k \bmod K)+1}|} \neq 0,$$

then \hat{B} contains a single element.

Proof. See the Appendix.

VII. An Independent Advertiser

Here we assume that the prospect is owned by a new player, called the advertiser, rather than the sender. This prospect is characterized by a parameter vector (θ, ρ) that is randomly drawn from a finite set $\Theta \times R \subset \mathbb{R}^2$. The first component θ represents the profit obtained by the advertiser if the prospect is accepted ($a = 1$). The second component ρ is a “relevance” parameter that, in combination with θ , determines the benefit $v(\theta, \rho) \in [0, 1]$ obtained by the receiver conditional on accepting the prospect.

The prospect’s profit parameter θ is privately observed by the advertiser, and its relevance parameter ρ is jointly observed by the advertiser and the sender. In this way, the sender enjoys at least partial knowledge of v . (The receiver observes neither θ nor ρ .) Let $h(\theta|\rho)$ denote the probability of θ conditional on ρ , with cumulative function $H(\theta|\rho)$.

The sender sells a signal lottery to the advertiser using a direct revelation mechanism. For each value of ρ , this mechanism requests a report $\hat{\theta}$ of the advertiser’s profitability θ and, on the basis of this report, determines (1) a lottery $\sigma(\hat{\theta}, \rho) \in \Delta(S)$ and (2) a monetary transfer $t(\hat{\theta}, \rho) \in \mathbb{R}$ from the advertiser to the sender.¹³ The goal of the sender is to maximize expected revenues $\mathbb{E}[t(\theta, \rho)]$ subject to the relevant participation and incentive constraints. For the time being we assume that the sender does not exclude any of the advertiser’s prospects, but we discuss this possibility below.

The timing is as follows:

1. The sender chooses a mechanism consisting of a disclosure rule $\sigma: \Theta \times R \rightarrow \Delta(S)$ and a transfer rule $t: \Theta \times R \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.
2. The advertiser draws a prospect $(\theta, \rho) \in \Theta \times R$.
3. The advertiser reports $\hat{\theta}$ and transfers $t(\hat{\theta}, \rho)$ to the sender.
4. A signal $s \in S$ is drawn from distribution $\sigma(\hat{\theta}, \rho)$ and shown to the receiver.
5. The receiver privately observes r and accepts or rejects the prospect.

¹³ Equivalently, the monetary transfer could be made contingent on receiver acceptance (such as having per-click rather than per-impression payments in online advertising auctions), in which case $t(\hat{\theta}, \rho)$ would simply represent the expected transfer conditional on $(\hat{\theta}, \rho)$.

We assume that the receiver has knowledge of the mechanism chosen by the sender as well as the prior distribution of (θ, ρ) . Accordingly, for any given signal s , the receiver's acceptance rate is given by $\mathbb{E}[v(\theta, \rho)|s]$, where the expectation is taken over (θ, ρ) .

The net expected profit obtained by an advertiser who is endowed with prospect (θ, ρ) and reports type $\hat{\theta}$ is given by

$$\theta \cdot \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[v|s]|\sigma(\hat{\theta}, \rho)] - t(\hat{\theta}, \rho),$$

where the first expectation is taken over s according to the lottery $\sigma(\hat{\theta}, \rho)$. The advertiser's participation and incentive constraints require, respectively, that this payoff must be nonnegative and maximized at $\hat{\theta} = \theta$.

For any given ρ , the highest transfers that the sender can obtain are determined by the binding participation constraint for the advertiser with the lowest value of θ and the binding downward-adjacent incentive constraints for all other advertisers. Accordingly, the sender's objective becomes

$$\mathbb{E}[t(\theta, \rho)] = \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[\pi(\theta, \rho)|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v(\theta, \rho)|s]), \quad (12)$$

where $\pi(\theta, \rho)$ denotes the "virtual profit" that the sender obtains from an advertiser with prospect (θ, ρ) . This virtual profit is given by

$$\pi(\theta, \rho) = \theta - (\theta' - \theta) \frac{1 - H(\theta|\rho)}{h(\theta|\rho)}, \quad (13)$$

where θ' denotes the type immediately above θ (or $\theta' = \theta$ if θ is the largest type), and $[1 - H(\theta|\rho)]/h(\theta|\rho)$ is the inverse hazard rate for θ .

In addition, the advertiser's incentive constraints require that the sender restrict herself to disclosure rules (σ, S) that result in a monotonic allocation. Namely, for any given ρ , the expected probability that $a = 1$ must be a nondecreasing function of the advertiser's profit θ :

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[v|s]|\sigma(\theta, \rho)] \text{ is nondecreasing in } \theta \text{ for all } \rho. \quad (M)$$

Aside from the monotonicity constraint, the sender's problem of maximizing (12) is identical to the original problem of maximizing (3), where π and v are now simply indexed by (θ, ρ) . Consequently, whenever the monotonicity constraint is slack, all results derived in Sections IV–VI apply. The following conditions guarantee that this constraint is in fact slack.

CONDITION 1. $\pi(\theta, \rho)$ is increasing in θ for all ρ .

Condition 1 is met, for example, when (i) θ takes only two values or (ii) the distribution H has an increasing hazard rate $h(\theta|\rho)/[1 - H(\theta|\rho)]$ and adjacent types θ, θ' are evenly spaced.

CONDITION 2. $v(\theta, \rho)$ is nondecreasing in θ for all ρ .

Condition 2 indicates that a more profitable advertiser also delivers higher consumer surplus.¹⁴

LEMMA 9. Under conditions 1 and 2 the monotonicity constraint (M) does not bind.

Proof. Consider a disclosure rule $\langle \sigma^*, S \rangle$ that maximizes (12) and is such that the posterior payoffs of all signals are strictly ordered (which is without loss for the sender because of lemma 2 and the fact that any pair of signals with posterior payoffs that are both ordered and unordered can be pooled without changing her objective). We show that such a disclosure rule satisfies (M).

Suppose not. Then, for some ρ , there must exist a pair θ_1 and θ_2 , with $\theta_1 < \theta_2$, such that

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[v|s]|\sigma^*(\theta_1, \rho)] > \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[v|s]|\sigma^*(\theta_2, \rho)].$$

This inequality implies that there exist two signals s_1 and s_2 with $\sigma_{s_1}^*(\theta_1, \rho)$ and $\sigma_{s_2}^*(\theta_2, \rho) > 0$ such that

$$\mathbb{E}[v|s_1] > \mathbb{E}[v|s_2]. \quad (14)$$

When combined with the fact that the posterior payoffs of all signals are strictly ordered, this inequality implies that

$$\mathbb{E}[\pi|s_1] > \mathbb{E}[\pi|s_2]. \quad (15)$$

However, since v and π are, respectively, nondecreasing and increasing in θ , we have $v(\theta_1, \rho) \leq v(\theta_2, \rho)$ and $\pi(\theta_1, \rho) < \pi(\theta_2, \rho)$. But when combined with (14) and (15), these inequalities contradict lemma 5. QED

Finally, whenever a prospect delivers negative virtual profits $\pi(\theta, \rho)$ (which is possible from [13] even when true profits θ are positive), the sender may wish to exclude it. Provided that the monotonicity constraint is slack so that the sender's problem reduces to the original one, we can compute the optimal probability of inclusion using the first-order conditions (10) derived in Section V.

A stylized application.—In practice, online search engines typically display links to their search results in three broad categories: left-hand-side sponsored links, left-hand-side organic links (displayed immediately

¹⁴ For instance, a more profitable advertiser may have a higher-quality product and therefore charge a higher price than his competitors. But this higher price may only partially capture the consumer's higher willingness to pay for the advertiser's product, therefore leaving more surplus for the consumer. To see this more formally, consider a simple example, gracefully suggested by Michael Schwarz. Suppose that the advertiser has an underlying private type t . When a consumer clicks on the respective ad, he draws a gross private value z for the advertiser's product, with z uniformly distributed over $[0, t]$, and purchases the product when z exceeds its price. Assuming zero marginal costs, the optimal price for the advertiser is $t/2$. This price delivers expected profits $t/4$ for the advertiser (which correspond to θ in our model) and expected surplus $t/8$ for the consumer (which corresponds to v). As a result, profits and consumer value are positively related. (This type of example can also be extended to include a role for the relevance parameter ρ .)

below the sponsored links), and right-hand-side sponsored links. The engine receives direct revenues from all sponsored links (which are auctioned off), but not from the organic ones (which are chosen on the basis of a measure of consumer value). The links on the left normally enjoy a significantly higher acceptance rate (or click-through) than those on the right.

In addition, it is reasonable to assume that many consumers do not draw a sharp distinction between the top organic links and the sponsored links on the left (e.g., despite being Bayesian updaters, users may optimally devote limited attention resources to distinguish between the two).¹⁵ In fact, search engines normally offer only a very mild visual distinction between these two types of links on the left, such as slight—sometimes almost imperceptible—background shading, which is suggestive of an attempt to pool.¹⁶ Thus, we can roughly interpret this scenario as the engine showing two types of signals: a low-quality “right-hand-side” signal that includes only low-revenue sponsored links and a high-quality “left-hand-side” signal that is shared by top organic and sponsored links.¹⁷

The following simple example illustrates how the model can provide a stylized rationale for the above practice.¹⁸

EXAMPLE 3. Suppose that the sender (search engine) has three prospects. The first two prospects (1 and 2) represent advertisers that share the same value of ρ but have different profit levels θ , with $\theta_1 > \theta_2 > 0$. Therefore, from equation (13), prospect 1 delivers a higher virtual profit for the sender—namely, $\pi_1 > \pi_2$ —and therefore condition 1 is met. Suppose that π_2 is positive. Moreover, suppose that consumer value is increasing in θ —namely, $v_1 > v_2$ —so that condition 2 is met as well. Finally, suppose that the third prospect represents an organic link that delivers no profit to the sender ($\pi_3 = 0$) but delivers high value for the consumer, with $v_3 > v_1, v_2$. (To formally fit this example in the model let $\Theta = \{\theta_1, \theta_2, 0\}$, $R = \{\text{sponsored, organic}\}$, and suppose that only the combinations $(\theta_1, \text{sponsored})$, $(\theta_2, \text{sponsored})$, and $(0, \text{organic})$ occur with a positive probability so that the remaining combinations can be ignored.)

¹⁵ We are grateful to Glenn Ellison for this observation.

¹⁶ The Chinese search engine *Baidu* offers no distinction whatsoever between some of its sponsored and organic links. This practice would be illegal in the United States.

¹⁷ We abstract from the fact that the specific position in which a sponsored link is displayed (within a given side of the page) also has an important effect on click-through.

¹⁸ Since the sender has only one prospect, while in practice search engines display multiple links at once, for the model to literally apply we need to make the additional strong assumption that there is no complementarity/substitutability across links, so that when presented with multiple links, the user clicks on every link that delivers an expected value higher than his opportunity cost—in which case the model with one prospect is equivalent to a model with many.

Notice that prospects 1 and 2 are ordered $(\pi_1, v_1) > (\pi_2, v_2)$ but prospect 3 lies to the NW of the first two, $\pi_3 < \pi_1, \pi_2$ and $v_3 > v_1, v_2$. Moreover, since conditions 1 and 2 are met, lemma 9 indicates that the monotonicity constraint is slack, and therefore the optimal disclosure policy solves program (6).

LEMMA 10. The optimal disclosure rule for example 3 involves two signals s_1 and s_2 . Advertiser $i = 1, 2$ is assigned signal s_i with probability one. The organic prospect, in contrast, serves as a bait and is randomly assigned one of the two signals (with possibly degenerate probabilities). Other things equal, the bait shares the signal of advertiser i with a higher probability if (1) this advertiser has a larger mass p_i and (2) the payoffs of this advertiser are more unordered vis-à-vis the payoffs of the bait (i.e., $|Z_{i3}|$ is larger).¹⁹

Proof. See the Appendix.

The two signals s_1 and s_2 in the lemma can be interpreted as the left-hand-side and right-hand-side signals that are used in practice. While the organic prospect in the example can in principle serve as bait for both advertisers, it will be pooled exclusively with the high-profit advertiser whenever $|Z_{13}|$ is large relative to $|Z_{23}|$. This would occur, for instance, when the difference in profitability between the two advertisers is sufficiently large.²⁰

While stylized, this example helps explain why, in practice, not all sponsored links are grouped together (e.g., on the right) and also why search engines do not introduce a sharper distinction between the top organic and sponsored links on the left (e.g., by placing the high-revenue sponsored links in an altogether separate location). Indeed, the example tells us that if all sponsored links were grouped, advertisers that are likely to be ordered would be bundled, therefore reducing profits. And it also tells us that introducing a sharper distinction on the left would make the organic links a less effective bait.

VIII. Extensions

A. Pareto-Optimal Disclosure Rules

Here we consider the more general problem of maximizing a weighted average of expected receiver surplus and expected sender profit rather than focusing on expected profit alone. The objective becomes

¹⁹ Recall that the example assumes $\pi_2 > 0$. If instead $\pi_2 < 0$, then prospect 2 would be ordered relative to prospects 1 and 3, and given that it delivers negative virtual profits, it would be strictly optimal to exclude it. Similarly, if $\pi_2 = 0$, excluding this prospect would be weakly optimal. In either case, prospects 1 and 3 would be pooled with probability one.

²⁰ Indeed, $|Z_{i3}| = |v_i - v_3| \pi_i$, which is increasing in π_i .

$$\lambda \mathbb{E}(\frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[v|s]^2) + (1 - \lambda) \mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s]), \quad (16)$$

where $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ is an arbitrary Pareto weight on the receiver. This problem captures a scenario in which competition against other platforms to attract consumers induces the sender to place a positive weight on consumer surplus.²¹

From linearity of the expectation operator, the above objective can be expressed as

$$\mathbb{E}\left(\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\lambda}{2} v + (1 - \lambda)\pi|s\right] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s]\right).$$

It follows that the problem of maximizing (16) is mathematically equivalent to the original problem after a linear transformation of the prospect's payoffs (π, v) into the new payoffs $(\hat{\pi}(\lambda), v)$, with $\hat{\pi}(\lambda) = (\lambda/2)v + (1 - \lambda)\pi$.²² Graphically, we can think of this transformation as a horizontal shift of the payoffs of each prospect toward a ray with slope 2, where the new payoffs correspond to a weighted average between (π, v) and $(\frac{1}{2}v, v)$. Figure 4 provides an illustration with three prospects (black balls). Patterned balls correspond to $\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$, and white balls correspond to $\lambda = 1$. Notice that as λ grows, prospect 1 eventually loses both potential pooling partners.

In the extreme when $\lambda = 1$ the sender cares exclusively about receiver surplus, and therefore, full separation becomes optimal. For intermediate levels of λ it may still be optimal to pool some pairs of prospects but not others. Let

$$\begin{aligned} Z_{ij}(\lambda) &= [\hat{\pi}_i(\lambda) - \hat{\pi}_j(\lambda)](v_i - v_j) \\ &= \frac{\lambda}{2} (v_i - v_j)^2 + (1 - \lambda)(\pi_i - \pi_j)(v_i - v_j), \end{aligned}$$

so that the transformed payoffs of any two prospects i and j are ordered if and only if $Z_{ij}(\lambda) \geq 0$.

If the original payoffs of these prospects, (π_i, v_i) and (π_j, v_j) , are strictly ordered, it follows that the new payoffs are strictly ordered as well. However, if the original payoffs are unordered, then the new payoffs

²¹ This model could also apply to the case in which prospects are owned by an independent advertiser (see n. 22). Here we abstract away from competition across platforms to attract the advertiser, but such competition would be immaterial if this advertiser employs a constant-return technology and advertises simultaneously on every platform that meets his participation constraint. In this case, the analysis in Sec. VII remains valid, with π interpreted as the sender's virtual profits per consumer.

²² If the sender acts as an intermediary, the assumption in Sec. VII that π is increasing and v is nondecreasing in θ remains sufficient for the monotonicity constraint to be slack. Indeed, when $\lambda < 1$, this assumption implies that $\hat{\pi}(\lambda)$ is also increasing in θ (as required by lemma 9), and when $\lambda = 1$, we obtain full separation, in which case the monotonicity constraint is automatically met.




FIG. 4.—Pareto-weighted payoffs

remain unordered if and only if $\lambda \in [0, \hat{\lambda}_{ij}]$, where

$$\hat{\lambda}_{ij} = \left(1 + \frac{1}{2} \left| \frac{v_i - v_j}{\pi_i - \pi_j} \right| \right)^{-1}.$$

Notice that $\hat{\lambda}_{ij} < 1$ whenever $v_i \neq v_j$. Thus, in the “generic” case in which prospects have different values, full separation is strictly optimal for all λ close to one.

B. Nonuniform Acceptance Rate

Here we return to the original problem of maximizing expected profits, but we discuss the case in which the receiver’s reservation value r is drawn from a general distribution G over $[0, 1]$. Conditional on observing a given signal s , the receiver’s acceptance rate becomes $\text{prob}\{r \leq \mathbb{E}[v|s]\} = G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])$. Thus, the sender’s expected profit from sending this signal is $\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])$. If an ex ante expectation is taken over signals according to σ , the sender’s payoff is now

$$\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot G(\mathbb{E}[v|s])). \tag{17}$$

We begin by computing the sender’s expected gain from pooling two prospects i and j into one signal $\hat{s} = \{i, j\}$ relative to separating them (while disclosing information about the other prospects as before). This gain is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
& (p_i + p_j)\mathbb{E}[\pi|\hat{s}] \cdot G(\mathbb{E}[v|\hat{s}]) - p_i\pi_i G(v_i) - p_j\pi_j G(v_j) \\
&= -\frac{p_i p_j}{p_i + p_j} (\pi_i - \pi_j)[G(v_i) - G(v_j)] \\
&\quad + (p_i + p_j)\mathbb{E}[\pi|\hat{s}] \cdot \{G(\mathbb{E}[v|\hat{s}]) - \mathbb{E}[G(v)|\hat{s}]\}.
\end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

When both prospects have the same acceptance rate G , pooling has no impact. In contrast, when $G(v_i) \neq G(v_j)$, pooling has two effects. First, as before, it shifts the acceptance rate from the more valuable prospect (with a higher rate G) to the less valuable prospect. This effect is captured by the first term in (18), which indicates that the shift in acceptance rate raises the sender's payoff when the more valuable prospect is also less profitable (the unordered case), and vice versa.

Second, depending on the curvature of G , pooling may also change the overall acceptance rate. This effect is captured by the expression in braces in the last term in (18). For example, when G is strictly concave, pooling increases the overall acceptance rate (by Jensen's inequality the expression in braces is positive), therefore raising profits. The opposite occurs when G is strictly convex. Once both effects are combined, we obtain the following lemma.

LEMMA 11. Pooling two prospects with different acceptance rates yields (strictly) higher profits for the sender than separating them if the prospects are (strictly) unordered and G is (strictly) concave and yields (strictly) lower profits if the prospects are (strictly) ordered and G is (strictly) convex.

From (18), we also learn that when G is nonlinear, the desirability to pool any two prospects with different values (and positive profits) inevitably depends on the specific shape of G . Indeed, if we let $\bar{v} = \mathbb{E}[v|\hat{s}]$, the left-hand side of (18) simplifies to $p_i\pi_i[G(\bar{v}) - G(v_i)] - p_j\pi_j[G(v_j) - G(\bar{v})]$. But since $G(\bar{v})$ lies anywhere between $G(v_i)$ and $G(v_j)$, this expression can always be either positive or negative, depending on the shape of G .²³ Consequently, when G is allowed to have an arbitrary shape, not much can be said in general about the optimal rule.

Nevertheless, we show that two of the lemmas in Section IV remain valid (provided that G is differentiable and strictly increasing): (1) the payoffs of prospects that are pooled together must lie on a straight line, and (2) pooling segments cannot intersect at an interior point.

LEMMA 12. Assume that G is differentiable and strictly increasing. In a profit-maximizing disclosure rule σ , for any given signal $s \in \mathcal{S}$, the

²³ For example, when $G(v_i) \neq G(v_j)$ and $G(\bar{v})$ is arbitrarily close to $\max\{G(v_i), G(v_j)\}$, pooling inevitably benefits the sender because it sharply increases the overall acceptance rate. The opposite occurs when $G(\bar{v})$ is arbitrarily close to $\min\{G(v_i), G(v_j)\}$.

payoffs of the prospects in the pool of s , $\{(\pi_i, v_i) : i \in P_s\}$, lie on a straight line.

Proof. See the Appendix.

To provide intuition for this result, it is useful to examine the curvature of the sender's profit function $\pi \cdot G(v)$. Along direction $(\Delta\pi, \Delta v)$, this curvature is given by

$$\frac{d^2}{dt^2} [(\pi + t\Delta\pi) \cdot G(v + t\Delta v)] = 2G'(v)\Delta\pi\Delta v + G''(v)\pi\Delta v^2. \quad (19)$$

Note that the first term is proportional to Δv , whereas the second term is proportional to Δv^2 . Thus, starting from an arbitrary point (π, v) with $G'(v) > 0$, we can always find an ordered direction $(\Delta\pi, \Delta v)$ with sufficiently small Δv along which the first term is larger than the second, and therefore $\pi \cdot G(v)$ is strictly convex.²⁴ Consequently, if a given signal pools prospects that do not lie on a straight line, this signal can always be spread out in a direction of convexity (as in fig. 1, but now spread out along a direction with sufficiently small slope), therefore increasing expected profits.

LEMMA 13. Assume that G is differentiable and strictly increasing. In a profit-maximizing disclosure rule σ , if the pooling segments of two signals do not lie on the same line, they can intersect only if they share an endpoint.

Proof. See the Appendix.

Beyond these results, little can be said about the optimal pooling graph for arbitrary G , given that its curvature can greatly influence the outcome. More can be said, however, when the curvature of G is mild. For example, if G is everywhere concave and its curvature is not strong enough to lead to pooling of strictly ordered prospects, then all the additional characterization results in Section IV continue to hold.

C. Receiver Incentives

We now consider the case in which the sender offers the receiver a monetary transfer $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ conditional on accepting the prospect—with a potentially different α for each signal s . (Note that the sender may represent the seller of a product whose price and production cost are $-\alpha$ and $-\pi$, respectively.) We allow r to be drawn from a general distribution G over $[0, 1]$.

Given a signal s , the receiver's expected value from accepting the prospect, inclusive of the transfer α , is given by $w = \mathbb{E}[v|s] + \alpha$. Thus, he accepts the prospect if and only if $r \leq w$, which occurs with prob-

²⁴ Indeed, for small Δv the acceptance rate G is approximately linear, and therefore the curvature of the sender's objective is essentially determined by the sign of $\Delta\pi\Delta v$.

ability $G(w)$. The sender's expected profit conditional on acceptance is $\mathbb{E}[\pi|s] - \alpha = \mathbb{E}[\pi + v|s] - w$. We can now treat $w \in \mathbb{R}$, rather than α , as the sender's choice variable (which is selected separately for each s).

For each signal s , letting $y = \mathbb{E}[\pi + v|s]$ denote the expected joint surplus given s , the sender's expected payoff from the optimal w can be represented as²⁵

$$U_s(y) = \max_{w \in \mathbb{R}} (y - w) \cdot G(w). \quad (20)$$

This representation allows us to see that full information disclosure is optimal.²⁶

PROPOSITION 3. When the sender uses monetary incentives, full information disclosure is optimal for any distribution G over $[0, 1]$.

Proof. The function U_s in (20) is convex because it is the upper envelope of a family of functions $(y - w) \cdot G(w)$, each of which is linear in y . It follows from Jensen's inequality that full separation is optimal: for any disclosure rule $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$,

$$\mathbb{E}[U_s(\mathbb{E}[\pi + v|s])] \leq \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[U_s(\pi + v)|s]] = \mathbb{E}[U_s(\pi + v)],$$

where $\mathbb{E}[U_s(\pi + v)]$ is the expected profit under full separation. QED

To develop intuition for this result, suppose that the sender pools two prospects into one signal s and offers the receiver value w for this signal. The sender can then instead separate the prospects, offering the receiver value w for each of the prospects. This modification will not change the probability of the receiver accepting each prospect, nor will it change the sender's expected profit conditional on acceptance, which will continue to be $\mathbb{E}[\pi + v|s] - w$. Hence, the sender will achieve exactly the same profit with full disclosure as he did with pooling. Observe also that with full disclosure it need not be optimal to offer the same receiver value w for both prospects. The sender will thus become strictly better off with full disclosure whenever optimality requires offering different receiver values for different prospects.

EXAMPLE 4. Suppose that r is uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$, so

²⁵ The maximization program in (20) is guaranteed to have a solution. When $y \leq 0$, any $w < 0$ (which implies $G(w) = 0$) is optimal. When $y > 0$, the existence of a solution follows from the fact that the objective function is upper semicontinuous over the relevant (compact) domain of optimization, namely, $w \in [0, y]$. (This upper semicontinuity in turn follows from the fact that the cdf G is nondecreasing and right continuous.)

²⁶ This result extends to the case in which the sender maximizes a weighted sum of receiver surplus and sender profits (as in Sec. VIII.A). The optimized objective becomes

$$U_s(y) = \max_{w \in \mathbb{R}} \left[\lambda \int_0^w (w - r) dG(r) + (1 - \lambda)(y - w) \cdot G(w) \right],$$

where we restrict attention to $\lambda \in [0, 1/2]$ (with $\lambda > 1/2$, the sender would wish to make an infinite money transfer to the receiver). Since receiver surplus does not directly depend on y , the same argument as in the proof of proposition 3 implies that U_s is a convex function, and therefore full disclosure is optimal.

that $G(w) = w$ over this interval. The sender's optimized payoff (20) then equals

$$U_s(y) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } y < 0 \\ \frac{1}{4}y^2 & \text{if } y \in [0, 2] \\ y - 1 & \text{if } y > 2. \end{cases}$$

(This expression follows from the optimality of setting $w = 0$ when $y < 0$, $w = \frac{1}{2}y$ when $y \in [0, 2]$, and $w = 1$ when $y > 2$.) Note that U_s is linear when $y < 0$, strictly convex when $y \in [0, 2]$ (since in this region w changes with y), and again linear when $y > 2$. The sender is indifferent between pooling and separating two prospects whenever it is optimal to induce the same acceptance rate for both of them. This occurs when (i) each prospect generates a weakly negative joint surplus $\pi_i + v_i \leq 0$ (since the optimal acceptance rate is zero for both prospects), (ii) each prospect generates a joint surplus $\pi_i + v_i$ weakly larger than two (since the optimal acceptance rate is one for both prospects), or (iii) the two prospects generate the same joint surplus $\pi_i + v_i$. In every other case, because of the strict convexity of U_s over $[0, 2]$, separating the two prospects is strictly optimal.

Despite disclosing all information, the sender does not generally implement first-best efficiency. Indeed, first-best efficiency means that the receiver accepts prospect i if and only if $\pi_i + v_i \geq r$. When $G'(\pi_i + v_i) > 0$, implementing this acceptance requires the sender to offer a transfer $\alpha = \pi_i$ for this prospect, leaving him with exactly zero profits, whereas a positive profit could be obtained with a transfer below π_i , which creates inefficiency.²⁷ This inefficiency can be viewed as resulting from monopoly pricing. Equivalently, it can be attributed to the sender's incentive to extract the receiver's information rents due to the latter's private information about r .

The result that full disclosure is optimal when transfers are allowed is related to the findings of Ottaviani and Prat (2001) and Eső and Szentes (2007) but does not follow from them. Ottaviani and Prat show that a monopolist facing a price discrimination problem finds it optimal to publicly reveal a signal affiliated to the buyer's private information. In their model, the payoff-relevant state is one-dimensional, whereas our state, (π, v, r) , cannot be collapsed into a single dimension while satisfying their affiliation condition. Eső and Szentes note that full disclosure is always optimal when the seller/auctioneer can offer buyers a mechanism before the disclosure, specifying how the disclosed information will be used. (Their main contribution lies in showing that in many cases the same outcome can be achieved when the disclosed information is observed only by the buyers and needs to be elicited by

²⁷ For example, when G is uniform, the receiver is induced to accept prospect i if and only if $\pi_i + v_i \geq 2r$, which implies that the acceptance rate is inefficiently low.

the mechanism.) In contrast, in our model with transfers, full disclosure turns out to be optimal even in the absence of ex ante contracting.²⁸

Note that offering money transfers may prove impractical in some applications because the receiver can potentially game the contract (e.g., there may exist a mass of strategic Internet users with very low clicking costs that are not interested in the advertiser's product per se but nevertheless click on the ad in order to exploit the transfer), or it may prove infeasible if the sender cannot directly contract with the receiver (e.g., a university may not be capable of offering payments to future employers of its students).

IX. Conclusion

We have studied a sender-receiver disclosure game in which the sender is endowed with a random prospect that has two-dimensional payoffs—known only to the sender—and the receiver has a private opportunity cost of accepting this prospect. The sender's problem is to select an information disclosure rule (a mapping from prospects to lotteries over signals) that maximizes her expected profits. We have shown that under the assumption that the receiver's opportunity cost is uniformly distributed over $[0, 1]$, the optimal randomized disclosure rule can be fully characterized and is generically unique.

When there are no monetary transfers between these players (as in the case of an Internet user not paying to click on the links offered by a search platform), the sender's optimal disclosure rule typically involves partial disclosure. For generic parameter values, the set of prospects is partitioned into three subsets: "bait" prospects, "switch" prospects, and "isolated" prospects, so that any possible pooling signal involves one bait prospect and one switch prospect. Each bait or switch prospect is pooled with other prospects with probability one, whereas each isolated prospect is never pooled. In contrast, when transfers are introduced (as in the case of a buyer-seller relationship), this bait-and-switch strategy is replaced with direct incentives, and full disclosure becomes optimal.

We also considered an environment in which the sender is an intermediary between the receiver and an independent advertiser who owns

²⁸ In our model the sender would not benefit from eliciting the receiver's r before disclosing information provided that G is increasing and differentiable, and the receiver's "virtual cost" of accepting the prospect, $\varphi(r) = r + G(r)/G'(r)$, is increasing in r . (This virtual cost accounts for the receiver's information rents, which are not captured by the sender.) Indeed, the virtual surplus is maximized by inducing acceptance for prospect i if and only if $\pi_i + v_i \geq \varphi(r)$, which can be achieved in the ex post mechanism with full disclosure that offers, for each prospect i , receiver value $w_i = 0$ when $\pi_i + v_i < \varphi(0)$, $w_i = 1$ when $\pi_i + v_i > \varphi(1)$, and $w_i = \varphi^{-1}(\pi_i + v_i)$ otherwise. Since the receiver with $r = 1$ is left with zero utility under both ex post and ex ante contracting, the sender's expected profit is the same by the revenue equivalence theorem.

the prospect. Through a simple example, we have argued that this model can help account for a stylized feature of Internet advertising: the use of organic links as baits for those sponsored links that are most profitable for the platform, with the latter visually separated from less profitable links. Finally, we have shown that the problem of finding Pareto-optimal disclosure rules turns out to be mathematically equivalent to the original problem of maximizing sender profits, upon a linear change of coordinates. As the Pareto weight on receiver welfare increases, the optimal rule eventually becomes fully revealing.

In future work, it would be interesting to extend this model along several dimensions:

1. Allowing different receiver types to have different preferences across prospects: in this case, we would expect an additional reason for hiding information, which occurs in models of optimal bundling with heterogeneous consumers.
2. Allowing the sender to be endowed with multiple prospects at once, with these prospects being complements or substitutes in the receiver’s payoff.
3. Studying mechanisms in which the receiver is asked to report his opportunity cost before being presented with a prospect (as in the model of Esö and Szentes [2007] but without the possibility of monetary transfers).

Appendix

A. Proof of Lemmas 7 and 8 and Proposition 2

We begin with some preliminary results.

LEMMA 14. Suppose that $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$ and $\langle \sigma', S' \rangle$ are optimal disclosure rules. Then, for any pair of signals $s \in S$ and $s' \in S'$, the posterior payoffs $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s']$ are ordered.

Proof. Suppose without loss that the sets S and S' have no signal in common (which is always possible through a relabeling of signals). Now consider a new disclosure rule $\langle \sigma'', S'' \rangle$ that results from randomizing between the two original rules $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$ and $\langle \sigma', S' \rangle$ with equal probability assigned to each. Namely, $S'' = S \cup S'$ and $\sigma''_s(i) = \frac{1}{2}[\sigma_s(i) + \sigma'_s(i)]$ for every $i \in P$ and $s \in S''$.

Since S and S' do not intersect, for any given $s \in S$ and $s' \in S'$, the posterior payoffs $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$ and $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s']$ are equal under the original and new disclosure rules. As a result, the expected payoff delivered by $\langle \sigma'', S'' \rangle$ is

$$\sum_{s \in S''} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma''_s(i) \mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s] = \frac{1}{2} \left(\sum_{s \in S} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma_s(i) \mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s] + \sum_{s \in S'} \sum_{i \in P} p_i \sigma'_s(i) \mathbb{E}[\pi|s] \cdot \mathbb{E}[v|s] \right),$$

where the two terms in braces represent, respectively, the payoffs delivered by $\langle \sigma, S \rangle$ and $\langle \sigma', S' \rangle$. It follows that $\langle \sigma'', S'' \rangle$ is also optimal. Consequently, from lemma 2, the set of posterior payoffs under $\langle \sigma'', S'' \rangle$, which is composed of all posterior payoffs from the original disclosure rules, must be ordered. QED

COROLLARY 1. Suppose that β and β' are solutions to program (6). If a given pair of prospects $\{i, j\} \in U$ is pooled under both β and β' , then the posterior payoffs $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|\{i, j\}]$ conditional on signal $\{i, j\}$ must be equal for both solutions. As a result, $\beta_{ij}/\beta_{ji} = \beta'_{ij}/\beta'_{ji}$.

Proof. For each solution, the posterior payoffs $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|\{i, j\}]$ lie on the straight line with negative slope connecting (π_i, v_i) and (π_j, v_j) . Consequently, if these posterior payoffs differed across solutions, they would be strictly unordered, a contradiction to lemma 14. QED

Proof of lemma 7. That \hat{B} is convex follows from the fact that the objective in (6) is concave (lemma 6) and the set of vectors $\beta \in \mathbb{R}^U$ that satisfy constraints (7), (8), and (11) is convex. For compactness, it suffices to show that \hat{B} contains its boundary. Suppose that β' belongs to the boundary of \hat{B} and let $\beta^n \in \hat{B}$, $n = 1, 2, \dots$, be a sequence converging to β' . Constraint (11) and corollary 1 imply that there exists a constant $C > 0$ such that, for every n and every $\{i, j\} \subset U$, $\beta^n_{ij} = C\beta^n_{ji}$. When we take the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$, this equality implies that β' satisfies constraint (11). In addition, since the objective $F(\beta)$ is continuous, β' must also be an optimum. It follows that $\beta' \in \hat{B}$. QED

Proof of lemma 8. We begin with necessity (\Rightarrow). Suppose that $\beta \in \hat{B}$ is not a vertex of \hat{B} . Since \hat{B} is convex, there must exist an optimum $\beta' \in \hat{B}$ that is arbitrarily close to β and yet $\beta' \neq \beta$. Indeed, we can select β' such that, for every $\{i, j\} \in U$, $\beta'_{ij} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \beta_{ij} > 0$. Let $\hat{U} \subset U$ denote the subset of pairs $\{i, j\} \in U$ such that $\beta_{ij} > 0$. Since β is not a vertex of \hat{B} , \hat{U} is nonempty. Moreover, from corollary 1,

$$\frac{\beta_{ij}}{\beta_{ji}} = \frac{\beta'_{ij}}{\beta'_{ji}} \quad \text{for all } \{i, j\} \in \hat{U}. \tag{A1}$$

Now let $\Delta\beta_{ij} = \beta_{ij} - \beta'_{ij}$. Constraint (7), which by proposition 1 binds for all pooled prospects, implies

$$\sum_{j:\{i,j\} \in \hat{U}} \Delta\beta_{ij} = 0 \quad \text{for all } i \in P. \tag{A2}$$

Since $\beta' \neq \beta$, there must exist a pair $\{i, j\} \in \hat{U}$ such that $\Delta\beta_{ij} \neq 0$. Moreover, whenever $\Delta\beta_{ij} \neq 0$, (A1) implies that $\Delta\beta_{ji} \neq 0$ (with $\text{sign}(\Delta\beta_{ji}) = \text{sign}(\Delta\beta_{ij})$), and equation (A2) in turn implies that there exists a prospect k , with $k \neq i$, such that $\Delta\beta_{jk} \neq 0$ (with $\text{sign}(\Delta\beta_{jk}) \neq \text{sign}(\Delta\beta_{ji})$). It follows that we can select an infinite sequence of prospects i_1, i_2, \dots (with repeated elements) such that, for all $k = 1, 2, \dots$, we have $i_k \neq i_{k+1}$ and $\Delta\beta_{i_k i_{k+1}} \neq 0$. Moreover, since $\Delta\beta_{i_k i_{k+1}} \neq 0$ requires by construction that $\beta_{i_k i_{k+1}} > 0$ and the set of prospects P is finite, β must contain a cycle.

We now turn to sufficiency (\Leftarrow). Suppose that $\beta \in \hat{B}$ contains a cycle among prospects (i_1, i_2, \dots, i_K) . Without loss, denote these prospects $(1, 2, \dots, K)$. Notice from proposition 1 that K must be even. For notational simplicity, let $K + 1 = 1$ and $k - 1 = K$ when $k = 1$. For every k in the cycle, let $\gamma_k = \beta_{k,k+1}/(\beta_{k,k+1} + \beta_{k+1,k})$ (i.e., the share of k in signal $\{k, k + 1\}$) and let $A_k = \sqrt{|Z_{k,k+1}|}$. The first-order conditions (9) for weights $\beta_{k,k+1}$ and $\beta_{k,k-1}$ (which are

both positive) are

$$(1 - \gamma_k) \cdot A_k = \gamma_{k-1} \cdot A_{k-1} = \sqrt{\Lambda_k}. \tag{A3}$$

Multiplying these first-order conditions across k and rearranging terms, we obtain

$$\prod_{k=1}^K \frac{1 - \gamma_k}{\gamma_k} = 1. \tag{A4}$$

We now show that there exist two optima $\beta', \beta'' \in \hat{B}$ both different from β such that $\beta = \frac{1}{2}(\beta' + \beta'')$, which in turn implies that β is not a vertex of \hat{B} . Select a small $\varepsilon > 0$ and, for all $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$, let

$$\begin{aligned} \beta'_{k,k+1} &= \beta_{k,k+1} + \Delta_k, & \beta'_{k,k-1} &= \beta_{k,k-1} - \Delta_k, \\ \beta''_{k,k+1} &= \beta_{k,k+1} - \Delta_k, & \beta''_{k,k-1} &= \beta_{k,k-1} + \Delta_k, \end{aligned} \tag{A5}$$

where the values of Δ_k satisfy $\Delta_1 = \varepsilon$ and

$$\Delta_{k+1} = -\frac{1 - \gamma_k}{\gamma_k} \cdot \Delta_k. \tag{A6}$$

(That the above equation can be satisfied for all k follows from eq. [A4] and the fact that K is even.) For all other pairs $\{i, j\} \in U$, let $\beta'_{ij} = \beta''_{ij} = \beta_{ij}$. Notice that, provided that ε is small, β' and β'' satisfy (11) and $\beta = \frac{1}{2}(\beta' + \beta'')$. Moreover, combining equations (A5) and (A6), we obtain

$$\frac{\beta'_{k,k+1}}{\beta'_{k+1,k}} = \frac{\beta''_{k,k+1}}{\beta''_{k+1,k}} = \frac{\beta_{k,k+1}}{\beta_{k+1,k}}.$$

As a result, β' and β'' lead to the same values of γ_k as the original optimum β , and therefore they also meet the first-order conditions (A3). It follows that $\beta', \beta'' \in \hat{B}$. QED

Proof of proposition 2. The first part of the proposition follows directly from lemmas 7 and 8. For the second part, we show that, under the assumed condition, no $\beta \in \hat{B}$ can be cyclic. As a result, from lemmas 7 and 8, \hat{B} must be a singleton. Suppose in negation that $\beta \in \hat{B}$ contains a cycle among a subset of prospects denoted $(1, 2, \dots, K)$. Notice from proposition 1 that K must be even. Moreover, from the proof of lemma 8, for every k in this subset, the first-order conditions (A3) must be met. Combining these first-order conditions to solve for the value of γ_1 , we obtain

$$\gamma_1 = \gamma_1 + \frac{1}{A_1} \sum_{k=1}^K (-1)^k A_k,$$

where $A_k = \sqrt{|Z_{k,(k \bmod K)+1}|}$. But this equation can hold only when $\sum_{k=1}^K (-1)^k A_k = 0$, which is ruled out by the assumed condition. QED

B. Proof of Lemma 10

The optimal disclosure rule solves the sender's program (6) with $P = \{1, 2, 3\}$, $U = \{\{1, 3\}, \{2, 3\}\}$, and the payoffs (π_i, v_i) described in the example, so that Z_{13} and Z_{23} are strictly negative. Since prospects 1 and 2 have only one potential pooling partner each (prospect 3), we can set, without loss, $\beta_{13} = p_1$ and $\beta_{23} = p_2$, so that the full masses of prospects 1 and 2 are pooled, respectively, into the signals $\{1, 3\}$ and $\{2, 3\}$. Denote these signals s_1 and s_2 .

It remains only to find optimal weights β_{31} and β_{32} (with $\beta_{31} + \beta_{32} = p_3$), which indicate how the mass of prospect 3 (the bait) is distributed between s_1 and s_2 . The corresponding first-order conditions (9) for these two weights are

$$\left(\frac{p_1}{\beta_{31} + p_1}\right)^2 \cdot |Z_{13}| \leq \lambda_3, \quad \text{with equality if } \beta_{31} > 0,$$

and

$$\left(\frac{p_2}{\beta_{32} + p_2}\right)^2 \cdot |Z_{23}| \leq \lambda_3, \quad \text{with equality if } \beta_{32} > 0.$$

Depending on the parameter values, we have three possible types of solutions. First, if

$$\left(\frac{p_1}{p_3 + p_1}\right)^2 \cdot |Z_{13}| \geq |Z_{23}|,$$

we obtain a corner solution in which $\beta_{31} = p_3$ and $\beta_{32} = 0$. In this case, the bait is exclusively pooled with advertiser 1 into signal s_1 , and advertiser 2 receives his own signal s_2 . Second, if

$$|Z_{13}| \leq \left(\frac{p_2}{p_3 + p_2}\right)^2 \cdot |Z_{23}|,$$

we obtain the opposite corner solution in which $\beta_{31} = 0$ and $\beta_{32} = p_3$. Third, in all other cases, we obtain an interior solution with $\beta_{31}, \beta_{32} > 0$, so that the bait shares part of his mass with each advertiser. In this case, both first-order conditions above hold with equality and we obtain

$$\frac{1 + \beta_{31}/p_1}{1 + \beta_{32}/p_2} = \sqrt{\frac{Z_{13}}{Z_{23}}}.$$

Inspection of this expression delivers the last statement in the lemma. QED

C. Proof of Lemma 12

Suppose not. Then the convex hull of $\{(\pi_i, v_i) : i \in P_s\}$, which we denote by H , has a nonempty interior that contains $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$. In addition, H contains $\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] - (\delta_1, \delta_2)$ for small $\delta_1, \delta_2 > 0$. Let $\lambda \in \Delta(P_s)$ be such that

$$\mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s] - (\delta_1, \delta_2) = \sum_{i \in P_s} \lambda_i \cdot (\pi_i, v_i).$$

Now consider a new disclosure rule $\hat{\sigma}$ that replaces the original signal s with two new signals s_1 and s_2 and for each $i \in P_s$ has $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_1}(i) = \varepsilon \lambda_i$ and $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_2}(i) = p_i \sigma_s(i) - \varepsilon \lambda_i$, where $\varepsilon > 0$ is chosen small enough so that $p_i \hat{\sigma}_{s_2}(i) > 0$ for all $i \in P_s$. (Also set $\hat{\sigma}_t(i) = \sigma_t(i)$ for all i and all $t \in S \setminus \{s\}$.) Let $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{v}) = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s]$ and $(\bar{\pi}_k, \bar{v}_k) = \mathbb{E}[(\pi, v)|s_k]$ for $k = 1, 2$. By construction, we obtain

$$(\bar{\pi}_1, \bar{v}_1) = (\bar{\pi}, \bar{v}) - (\delta_1, \delta_2) \tag{A7}$$

and

$$\frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} (\bar{\pi}_1, \bar{v}_1) + \frac{q_s - \varepsilon}{q_s} (\bar{\pi}_2, \bar{v}_2) = (\bar{\pi}, \bar{v}),$$

where $q_s = \sum_{i \in P_s} p_i \sigma_s(i)$. These equations in turn imply

$$(\bar{\pi}_2, \bar{v}_2) = (\bar{\pi}, \bar{v}) + \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s - \varepsilon} \cdot (\delta_1, \delta_2). \quad (\text{A8})$$

The sender's gain from adopting $\hat{\sigma}$ relative to σ is

$$\begin{aligned} & \varepsilon \cdot \bar{\pi}_1 G(\bar{v}_1) + (q_s - \varepsilon) \cdot \bar{\pi}_2 G(\bar{v}_2) - q_s \cdot \bar{\pi} G(\bar{v}) = \\ & \frac{\varepsilon(q_s - \varepsilon)}{q_s} (\bar{\pi}_2 - \bar{\pi}_1) [G(\bar{v}_2) - G(\bar{v}_1)] \\ & - q_s \bar{\pi} \left[G(\bar{v}) - \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot G(\bar{v}_1) - \frac{q_s - \varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot G(\bar{v}_2) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

From (A7) and (A8) and letting $\alpha = \varepsilon/(q_s - \varepsilon)$, this gain is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\varepsilon(q_s - \varepsilon)}{q_s} (1 + \alpha) \delta_1 [G(\bar{v} + \alpha \delta_2) - G(\bar{v} - \delta_2)] \\ & - q_s \bar{\pi} \left[G(\bar{v}) - \frac{\varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot G(\bar{v} - \delta_2) - \frac{q_s - \varepsilon}{q_s} \cdot G(\bar{v} + \alpha \delta_2) \right], \end{aligned}$$

which we denote by $\Phi(\varepsilon, \delta_1, \delta_2)$. Now fix small $\varepsilon, \delta_1 > 0$. Notice that $\Phi(\varepsilon, \delta_1, 0)$ is zero, and the partial derivative $(\partial/\partial\delta_2)\Phi(\varepsilon, \delta_1, 0)$ is strictly positive:

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial\delta_2} \Phi(\varepsilon, \delta_1, 0) = \frac{\varepsilon(q_s - \varepsilon)}{q_s} (1 + \alpha)^2 \delta_1 G'(\bar{v}) > 0.$$

It follows that $\Phi(\varepsilon, \delta_1, \delta_2)$ is strictly positive for any small $\delta_2 > 0$, which contradicts the optimality of the original disclosure rule σ . QED

D. Proof of Lemma 13

Identical to the proof of lemma 4 (see Sec. IV), but with lemma 12 replacing lemma 3 in the last line of the proof. QED

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