Topics Course: Optimal Unemployment Insurance

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Outline

In this course we cover the theory and quantitative results regarding the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems. The economies under consideration feature incentive problems (*moral hazard*) or a frictional labor market (*search and matching*). There will also be a small share of empirical literature. The open-ended question of the course we will be the effect of savings and the induced wealth heterogeneity on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems.

Organization

We meet on Friday from 10:15 to 11:45. The first meeting will be held on October 21. Currently, the room is the seminar room 062 but maybe I will do a change. In this case a new room will be announced on my webpage. The grading will be based on a paper presentation and the presentation of an own research idea as a research proposal. Please sign in asap.

You find the course in eCampus at https://ilias.uni-bonn.de/ilias/goto_ecampus_crs_51842.html.

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