Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Assigning an unpleasant task without payment
Author-Name: Susanne Goldlücke
Author-Email: susanne.goldluecke@uni-konstanz.de
Author-Name: Thomas Tröger
Author-Email: troeger@uni-mannheim.de
Classification-JEL: D82; D71; D62; H41
Keywords: Volunteering; public good provision; mechanism design

Abstract: How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done
but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for
the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary
transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the
service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The
optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among
volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task
among the non-volunteers.

Note: 
Length: 24
Creation-Date: 2018-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp003
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_003