Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure
Author-Name: Daniel Kraehmer
Author-Email: 
Classification-JEL: D82, H57
Keywords: information design, mechanism design, quasi-linear utility, rent extraction

Abstract: I study mechanism design settings with quasi-linear utility where the principal can
provide agents with additional private information about their valuations beyond the private
information they hold at the outset. I demonstrate that the principal can design information
and a mechanism so as to fully extract the complete information first-best surplus if agents’
ex ante information only affects their beliefs about, yet not their valuations. Otherwise, the
result holds if each agent’s initial private beliefs satisfy a spanning condition.

Note: 
Length: 36
Creation-Date: 2018-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp011
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_011