Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Dynamic Expert Incentives: Complementarity and Substitutability in Information Acquisition
Author-Name: Tsz-Ning Wong
Author-Email: tsz-ning.wong@aalto.fi
Author-Name: Lily Ling Yang
Author-Email: lily.yang@uni-mannheim.de
Classification-JEL: D82, D83
Keywords: Information Acquisition; Persuasion; Voluntary Disclosure; Free-riding

Abstract: We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts
over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery
to a decision maker. We propose a definition of strategic complementarity and substitutability in this
setting and find that the experts' information acquisition decisions are always substitutes when the experts
are homogeneous, but sometimes complements when the experts are heterogeneous.

Note: 
Length: 41
Creation-Date: 2018-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp026
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_026