Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Skewed Information Transmission
Author-Name: Francesc Dilmé
Author-Email: fdilme@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D82, D83
Keywords: Strategic Communication, Skewed Preferences

Abstract: This paper analyzes strategic information transition between skewed agents.
More concretely, we study the Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting in the case where agents
are not biased, but they differ on the relative importance they put on avoiding "upward"
or "downward" mistakes. We show that, even though the agents could fully communicate when
the state of the world was perfectly observed by the sender, the information transmission
is significantly imprecise in any equilibrium when there is a small noise in the observation.
Hence, contrary to what was previous thought, a low objective misalignment is not
sufficient for precise equilibrium communication.

Note: 
Length: 18
Creation-Date: 2018-07
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp033
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_033