Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Striking a Balance of Power Between the Court of Justice and the EU Legislature: The Law on Competition Damages Actions as a Paradigm
Author-Name: Jens-Uwe Franck
Author-Email: jfranck@mail.uni-mannheim.de
Classification-JEL: K21
Keywords: Institutional balance; Principle of effectiveness; Democratic legitimacy; EU competition damages law; Courage v Crehan; Directive 2014/104; Access to leniency documents

Abstract: The framework of EU law on cartel damages actions consists in part of rules established by
the ECJ based on arts 101 and 102 TFEU in conjunction with the principle of effectiveness. These rules
are an integral part of EU primary law. The notion of institutional balance, however, requires the
Court to consider its own inherent limits on democratic legitimacy, accountability and expertise.
In particular, the Court has to ensure that adequate scope remains for the EU legislature to exercise
its legislative power pursuant to art.103 TFEU. It is argued that the ECJ has disregarded these
restrictions and overstretched the principle of effectiveness––for instance, in its adjudication on
liability for umbrella pricing and on access to leniency files, respectively. Consequently, the EU
legislature must not consider itself bound by these standards.

Note: 
Length: 24
Creation-Date: 2018-08
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp037
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_037