Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Expectations of Reciprocity and Feedback When Competitors Share Information: Experimental Evidence
Author-Name: Bernhard Ganglmair
Author-Email: ganglmair@uni-mannheim.de
Author-Name: Alex Holcomb
Author-Email: ajholcomb@utep.edu
Author-Name: Noah Myung
Author-Email: noah.myung@virginia.edu
Classification-JEL: O33, D8, C72, C91
Keywords: knowledge diffusion; information sharing; reciprocity; collective innovation; R&D; conversation; experimental economics; centipede game

Abstract: Informal know-how trading and exchange of information among
competitors has been well-documented for a variety of industries, 
including in science and R&D, and an individual’s expectations of 
reciprocity is understood to be a key determinant of such flow of 
information. We establish a feedback loop (as a representation of 
information trading) in the laboratory and show that an individual’s 
expectations of the recipient’s intentions to reciprocate matter more 
than a recipient’s ability to do so. This implies that reducing 
strategic uncertainty about competitors’ behavior has a bigger effect 
on the flow of information than reducing environmental uncertainty 
(about their ability to generate new information). We also show that 
the formation of beliefs about a recipient’s intentions to reciprocate 
are heavily influenced by past experience, where prior experience lingers 
and can have negative effects on the sustainability of productive and 
fruitful information exchange.

Note: 
Length: 55
Creation-Date: 2018-09
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp040
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_040