Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Patent Pools, Vertical Integration, and Downstream Competition
Author-Name: Markus Reisinger
Author-Email: m.reisinger@fs.de
Author-Name: Emanuele Tarantino
Author-Email: tarantino@uni-mannheim.de
Classification-JEL: K11, L41, L42, O34
Keywords: patent pools and horizontal pricing agreements, complementary patents, vertical integration and restraints, antitrust policy

Abstract: Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. 
Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, 
we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and non-linear tariffs.
 We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: 
 Whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, 
 the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade-off
 between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive 
 if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. 
 We then formulate information-free policies to screen anticompetitive pools. 

Note: 
Length: 54
Creation-Date: 2018-11
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp057
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2018_057