Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Media See-Saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets
Author-Name: Simon P. Anderson
Author-Email: sa9w@virginia.edu
Author-Name: Martin Peitz
Author-Email: Martin.Peitz@gmail.com
Classification-JEL: D43, L13
Keywords: two-sided markets, media economics, mergers, entry, advertising, aggregative games, single-homing, multi-homing, competitive bottleneck

Abstract: e customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study media platforms
which may differ by popularity. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied
together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are
a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers.
Entry increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if total platform
profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus
tends to increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like
advertising, advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned. We show see-saws
under alternative homing assumptions.

Note: 
Length: 80
Creation-Date: 2019-12
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp089
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2019_089v2