Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Fake Experts
Author-Name: Patrick Lahr
Author-Email: patricklahr@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Justus Winkelmann
Author-Email: jwinkelmann@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D83, D71
Keywords: Cheap Talk, Information Aggregation, Voting

Abstract: We consider a multi-sender cheap talk model, where the receiver faces
uncertainty over whether senders have aligned or state-independent preferences. This uncertainty generates a trade-off between giving sufficient
weight to the most informed aligned senders and minimizing the influence of the unaligned. We show that preference uncertainty diminishes the benefits from specialization, i.e., senders receiving signals with
more dispersed accuracy. When preference uncertainty becomes large, it
negates them entirely, causing qualified majority voting to become the
optimal form of communication. Our results demonstrate how political
polarization endangers the ability of society to reap the benefits of specialization in knowledge.

Note: 
Length: 38
Creation-Date: 2019-05
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp093
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2019_093