Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Efficient Sequential Screening
Author-Name: Boaz Zik
Author-Email: bzik@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D61, D62, D82
Keywords: Efficient mechanisms; Sequential screening; Interdependent valuations; Multidimensional information; Informational externalities

Abstract: A seller of an item faces a potential buyer whose valuation depends on multiple private signals. When there are informational externalities and the buyer's private signals arrive all at once efficient implementation is impossible. We show that if the buyer's private signals arrive over time in a particular order then the seller can implement efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.

Note: 
Length: 29
Creation-Date: 2019-07
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp104
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2019_104