Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Structural Empirical Analysis of Vacancy Referrals With Imperfect Monitoring and the Strategic Use of Sickness Absence
Author-Name: Gerard J. van den Berg
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Hanno Foerster
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Arne Uhlendorff
Author-Email: 

Classification-JEL: J64, J65, C51, C54 
Keywords: unemployment, wage, sanctions, moral hazard, sickness absence, physician, structural estimation, counterfactual policy evaluation, unemployment duration

Abstract: This paper provides a structural analysis of the role of job vacancy referrals (VRs)
by public employment agencies in the job search behavior of unemployed individuals,
incorporating institutional features of the monitoring of search behavior by the agencies. 
Notably, rejections of VRs may lead to sanctions (temporary benefits reductions)
while workers may report sick to avoid those. We estimate models using German administrative 
data from social security records linked with caseworker recorded data
on VRs, sick reporting and sanctions. The analysis highlights the influence of aspects
of the health care system on unemployment durations. We estimate that for around
25% of unemployed workers, removing the channel that enables strategic sick reporting
reduces the mean unemployment duration by 4 days.

Note: 
Length: 44
Creation-Date: 2019-08
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp123
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2019_123v2