Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
Author-Name: Carl Heese
Author-Email: heese@hku.hk
Author-Name: Stephan Lauermann
Author-Email: s.lauermann@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: D70
Keywords: Voting, Information Aggregation, Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Abstract: This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous,
private preferences and exogenous private information about
an unknown state of the world. We show that a Bayesian persuader can
achieve any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional
information. In this setting, without the persuader’s additional information,
a version of the Condorcet jury theorem holds, in the sense that
outcomes of large elections satisfy full-information equivalence (Feddersen
and Pesendorfer, 1997). Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge
of the voters’ private information, preferences, or the voting rule. It also
requires almost no commitment power on the part of the persuader.

Note: 
Length: 65
Creation-Date: 2019-09
Revision-Date: 2024-12
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp128
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2019_128v2