Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Strategies Under Strategic Uncertainty
Author-Name: Helene Mass
Author-Email: hmass@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: D81, D82, D83
Keywords: Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness,
Rationalizability

Abstract: I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete
information who faces uncertainty about the other players’ strategies.
I propose a new decision criterion — the rational maximin criterion
— which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of
rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable.
Second, I apply the maximin criterion. Using this decision criterion,
one can derive predictions about outcomes and recommendations
for players facing strategic uncertainty. I analyze applications to
first-price auctions, contests, and bilateral trade.

Note: 
Length: 50
Creation-Date: 2020-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp157
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_157