Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Network Goods, Price Discrimination, and Two-sided Platforms
Author-Name: Paul Belleflamme
Author-Email: Paul.Belle.amme@uclouvain.be
Author-Name: Martin Peitz
Author-Email: Martin.Peitz@gmail.com
Classification-JEL: D21, D42, L12, L14
Keywords: Network goods, two-sided platforms, platform pricing, group pricing, versioning,
freemium

Abstract: A monopolist selling a network good to heterogeneous users is shown to become a twosided
platform if it can condition prices on some user characteristics or if it cannot but
induces user self-selection by offering screening contracts. This shows that the availability of
sophisticated pricing instruments is essential to make a platform two-sided, not the ability to
distinguish separate user groups. The use of freemium strategies (which consists of offering
a base version at zero price and a premium version at a positive price) emerges as a special
case of versioning.

Note: 
Length: 30
Creation-Date: 2023-03
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp188
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_188v2