Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Information Design and Career Concerns
Author-Name: David Rodina
Author-Email: drodina1988@gmail.com

Classification-JEL: D8
Keywords: Information Design

Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between information and incentives
in principal-agent relationships with career concerns. I derive conditions
for when more precise information about performance or more
uncertainty about the agent's ability lead to stronger incentives due to
career concerns, absent any ad-hoc restrictions on the production technology
or set of information structures. A key condition for deriving
these comparative statics is how e ort changes the informativeness of
performance signals regarding ability. However, more sophisticated information
revelation technologies that are implicitly ruled out in the
literature overturn commonly held assertions regarding information design
and career concerns.

Note: 
Length: 62
Creation-Date: 2020-10
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp220
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_220