Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement
Author-Name: Nicolas Fugger
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Vitali Gretschko
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Helene Mass
Author-Email: hmasss@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Achim Wambach
Author-Email: 

Classification-JEL: D44, D73, D82, L13
Keywords: Discrimination, symmetric auctions, procurement regulation

Abstract: Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination
requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai
show that such regulation imposes virtually no
restrictions on the ability to discriminate. We propose a
simple rule - imitation perfection - that restricts
discrimination significantly. It ensures that in every
equilibrium bidders with the same valuation distribution
and the same valuation earn the same expected utility. If
all bidders are homogeneous, revenue and social surplus
optimal auctions consistent with imitation perfection
exist. For heterogeneous bidders, however, it is
incompatible with revenue and social surplus
optimization. Thus, a trade-off between
non-discrimination and optimality exists.

Note: 
Length: 64
Creation-Date: 2020-11
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp225
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_225v2