Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Persuading an Informed Committee
Author-Name: Nina Bobkova
Author-Email: nina.bobkova@rice.edu
Author-Name: Saskia Klein
Author-Email: s6safuch@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: Voting, Bayesian Persuasion, Strategic Voting, Unanimity

Abstract: A biased sender seeks to persuade a committee to vote for a proposal by providing public
information about its quality. Each voter has some private information about the proposal's
quality. We characterize the sender-optimal disclosure policy under unanimity rule when the
sender can versus cannot ask voters for a report about their private information. The sender
can only profit from asking agents about their private signals when the private information is
sufficiently accurate. For all smaller accuracy levels, a sender who cannot elicit the private
information is equally well off.

Note: 
Length: 50
Creation-Date: 2020-11
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp230
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_230