Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains
Author-Name: Tobias Rachidi
Author-Email: tobias.rachidi@uni-bonn.de


Classification-JEL: D71, D72, D82
Keywords: Voting; Generalized Single-Peaked Preferences; Mechanism Design

Abstract: This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms in a setting with more than
two alternatives and voters who have generalized single-peaked preferences derived
from median spaces as introduced in [Nehring and Puppe, 2007b]. This class of
preferences is considerably larger than the well-known class of preferences that are
single-peaked on a line. I characterize the voting rules that maximize the ex-ante
utilitarian welfare among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness,
anonymity, and surjectivity. The optimal mechanism takes the form of voting by
properties, that is, the social choice is determined through a collection of binary
votes on subsets of alternatives involving qualified majority requirements that reflect
the characteristics of these subsets of alternatives. This general optimality
result is applied to the design of voting mechanisms for the provision of two costly
public goods subject to the constraint that the provided level of one good is weakly
higher than the provided level of the other good.

Note: 
Length: 41
Creation-Date: 2021-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp214
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2020_214v2