Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Collective Brand Reputation
Author-Name: Volker Nocke
Author-Email: volker.nocke@gmail.com
Author-Name: Roland Strausz
Author-Email: roland.strausz@hu-berlin.de

Classification-JEL: L14, L15, D20, D82
Keywords: Collective branding, reputation, free riding, repeated games, imperfect monitoring

Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product
quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect
public monitoring, we model collective branding as a pooling of quality signals generated
in different markets. Such pooling yields a beneficial informativeness effect for the
actions of a global player present in all markets, but also harmful free-riding by local,
market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size
and revenue sharing, applying to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella
branding, and firms with team production.

Note: 
Length: 51
Creation-Date: 2021-03
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp281
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2021_281