Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice
Author-Name: Andreas Kleiner
Author-Email: andreas.kleiner@asu.edu
Author-Name: Benny Moldovanu
Author-Email: mold@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: D71, D72
Keywords: 

Abstract: We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several
alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a "left-right" axis.
Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be
designed? We assume preferences are single-peaked on a tree and
study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the
tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are
subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides
with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and
revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empirical implications
for two case studies.

Note: 
Length: 40
Creation-Date: 2021-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp289
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2021_289