Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition
Author-Name: Ludmila Matysková
Author-Email: lmatysko@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Alfonso Montes
Author-Email: alfonso.montes-sanchez@cyu.fr

Classification-JEL: D72, D81, D82, D83
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, Rational inattention, Costly information acquisition, Information design

Abstract: A sender choosing a signal to be disclosed to a receiver can often in
fluence
the receiver's actions. Is persuasion harder when the receiver has additional
information sources? Does the receiver benefit from having them? We extend
Bayesian persuasion to a receiver's acquisition of costly information. The
game can be solved as a standard Bayesian persuasion under an additional
constraint - the receiver never learns. The `threat' of learning hurts the sender.
However, the outcome can also be worse for the receiver, in which case the
receiver's possibility to gather additional information decreases social welfare.
Furthermore, we propose a new solution method that does not rely directly
on concavification, which is also applicable to standard Bayesian persuasion.

Note: 
Length: 55
Creation-Date: 2021-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp296
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2021_296