Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Voting With Endogenous Timing
Author-Name: Finn Schmieter 
Author-Email: finn.schmieter@uni-bonn.de 


Classification-JEL: D72, D82, D83
Keywords: Elections, Pivotal Voting, Communication, Information

Abstract: This paper analyses the role of timing in common-value elections. There are
two voting periods where voters can decide for themselves when to publicly cast
their votes after receiving private signals. In welfare-optimal equilibria, agents
use their timing to communicate the strength of their private information to
the other voters. This communication allows for better information aggregation
than simultaneous voting or voting with exogenously fixed timing. In the case
of a simple majority voting rule, a second voting period mitigates the Swing
Voter’s Curse more effectively than abstention.

Note: 
Length: 36
Creation-Date: 2022-01
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp328
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_328