Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Collusion Between Non-differentiated Two-Sided Platforms
Author-Name: Martin Peitz
Author-Email: martin.peitz@gmail.com
Author-Name: Lily Samkharadze
Author-Email: 


Classification-JEL: L41, L13, D43
Keywords: Two-sided markets, tacit collusion, cartelization, price structure, platform
competition

Abstract: Platform competition can be intense when offering non-differentiated services. However,
competition is somewhat relaxed if platforms cannot set negative prices. If platforms
collude they may be able to implement the outcome that maximizes industry
profits. In an infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring, this is feasible if the
discount factor is sufficiently large. When this is not possible, under some condition,
a collusive outcome with one-sided rent extraction along the equilibrium path can be
sustained that leads to higher profits than the non-cooperative outcome.

Note: 
Length: 20
Creation-Date: 2022-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp331
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_331v2