Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Strategic Communication With a Small Conflict of Interest
Author-Name: Francesc Dilmé
Author-Email: fdilme@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: C72, D82, D83
Keywords: Strategic Communication, Small Bias

Abstract: This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver
with similar objectives. We provide a first-order approximation of the equilibrium
behavior in the general version of the Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model with
a small bias. Our analysis goes beyond the usual uniform-quadratic setting: we uncover
how the state-dependent bias and the non-uniform state distribution influence
the precision with which each state of the world is communicated. We illustrate the
approach by providing novel comparative statics results in different applications.

Note: 
Length: 34
Creation-Date: 2022-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp344
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_344