Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Optimal Information Design of Online Marketplaces with Return Rights
Author-Name: Jonas von Wangenheim
Author-Email: jwangenheim@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D82, D47, D18,
Keywords: information disclosure, sequential screening, information design,
strategic learning, Bayesian persuasion, mechanism design, platform economics,
consumer protection


Abstract: Consumer data increasingly enable online marketplaces to identify buyers’ 
preferences and provide individualized product information. Buyers,
however, fully learn their product value only after contracting, when the
product is delivered. I characterize the impact of such ex-ante information
on buyer surplus and seller surplus, when the seller sets prices and refund
conditions in response to the ex-ante information. I show that efficient
trade and an arbitrary split of the surplus can be achieved. For the buyer-
optimal signal low-valuation buyers remain partially uninformed. Such a
signal induces the seller to sell at low prices without refund options.

Note: 
Length: 28
Creation-Date: 2022-05
Revision-Date: 2024-04
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp352
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_352v2