Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition
Author-Name: Daniil Larionov
Author-Email: daniil.larionov@zew.de
Author-Name: Hien Pham
Author-Email: hien.pham@tse-fr.eu
Author-Name: Takuro Yamashita
Author-Email: yamashita.takuro.osipp@osaka-u.ac.jp
Author-Name: Shuguang Zhu
Author-Email: zhu.shuguang@mail.shufe.edu.cn
Classification-JEL: D82
Keywords: Mechanism Desgin, Implementation, First Best, Information Acquisition

Abstract: We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There
is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states.
 The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire
information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as
it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent from the state, we show
that there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice
rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.

Note: 
Length: 21
Creation-Date: 2022-12
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp377
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_377