Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Search Disclosure
Author-Name: Carl-Christian Groh
Author-Email: cgroh@mail.uni-mannheim.de
Author-Name: Marcel Preuss
Author-Email: preuss@cornell.edu
Classification-JEL: D18, D83, L13, L86
Keywords: Search, Information Exchange, Antitrust, Price Discrimination

Abstract: We study information sharing between competing sellers in markets where consumers
sample sellers sequentially. Sellers can disclose to their rival when they encounter
a buyer. Providing this information, which we call search disclosure, can enable
all forms of search history-based price discrimination. Yet, firms only conduct search
disclosure in equilibrium if search costs are low or price revisions are infeasible. The
kind of search disclosure that can emerge in equilibrium leads to price discrimination
that reduces consumer surplus and total welfare. However, if firms were mandated to
use search disclosure at all times, consumer surplus would be higher.

Note: 
Length: 59
Creation-Date: 2022-12
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp384
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2022_384