Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Revenue Maximization With Partially Verifiable Information
Author-Name: Marco Reuter
Author-Email: marco.reuter@gess.unimannheim.de
Classification-JEL: D44, D82, D83
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Auctions, Partially Verifiable Types,
Communication

Abstract: I consider a seller selling a good to bidders with two-dimensional private
 information: their valuation for a good and their characteristic. While valuations
are non-verifiable, characteristics are partially verifiable and convey
information about the distribution of a bidder’s valuation. I derive the
revenue-maximizing mechanism and show that it can be implemented by
introducing a communication stage before an auction. I show that granting
bidders a right to remain anonymous, i.e., to refuse participation in the
communication stage, leaves the optimal mechanism unchanged and provides
no benefits for the bidders.

Note: 
Length: 38
Creation-Date: 2023-02
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp395
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_395