Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Information Transmission in Voluntary Disclosure Games
Author-Name: Avi Lichtig
Author-Email: alichtig@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Ran Weksler
Author-Email: rweksler@econ.haifa.ac.il
Classification-JEL: D82, D83, L15
Keywords: Evidence, Informativeness

Abstract: Does a better-informed sender transmit more accurate information in equilibrium? We
show that, in a general class of voluntary disclosure games, unlike other strategic communication
environments, the answer is positive. If the sender’s evidence is more Blackwell
informative, then the receiver’s equilibrium utility increases. We apply our main
result to show that an uninformed sender who chooses a test from a Blackwell-ordered
set does so efficiently.

Note: 
Length: 36
Creation-Date: 2023-03
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp405
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_405