Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Voting With Interdependent Values: The Condorcet Winner
Author-Name: Alex Gershkov
Author-Email: alexg@huji.ac.il
Author-Name: Andreas Kleiner
Author-Email: andreas.kleiner@asu.edu
Author-Name: Benny Moldovanu
Author-Email: mold@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Xianwen Shi
Author-Email: xianwen.shi@utoronto.ca
Classification-JEL: D72
Keywords: Voting, interdependent values, Condorcet winner

Abstract: We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences
and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results
show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Con-
dorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly di¤erent
outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner
under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implemen-
tation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because di¤erent voting rules (including
dynamic ones) induce di¤erent processes of information aggregation and learning.

Note: 
Length: 26
Creation-Date: 2023-04
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp414
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_414