Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions
Author-Name: Vitali Gretschko
Author-Email: gretschko@zew.de
Author-Name: Helene Mass
Author-Email: hmass@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D44, D81, D82
Keywords: Auctions, worst-case equilibria, uncertainty

Abstract: The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders
know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do
not know the precise distribution of their competitors’ valuations, but only the mean of
the distribution. We propose a novel equilibrium solution concept based on worst-case
reasoning. We find an essentially unique and efficient worst-case equilibrium of the first-price auction, 
which has appealing properties from both the bidders’ and the seller’s point
of view.


Note: 
Length: 38
Creation-Date: 2023-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp434
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_434