Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Data Linkage Between Markets: Does Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm?
Author-Name: Francesc Dilmé
Author-Email: fdilme@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, C73
Keywords: Sequential stability, stable outcome, signaling games


Abstract:  This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive games. An outcome
ω is sequentially stable if for any ε>0, any version of the game where players make mistakes
with small enough probability has a perfect "-equilibrium with outcome close to ω. Unlike
stable outcomes (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), sequentially stable outcomes exist for all finite
games and are sequentially rational. If there is a unique sequentially stable outcome, such an
outcome is the unique stable outcome of the game’s agent normal form. Also, sequentially stable 
outcomes satisfy versions of forward induction, iterated strict equilibrium dominance, and
invariance to simultaneous moves. In signaling games, sequentially stable outcomes pass the
standard selection criteria, and when payoffs are generic, they coincide with stable outcomes.


Note: 
Length: 44
Creation-Date: 2023-09
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp463
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_463