Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Shaking Up the System: When Populism Disciplines Elite Politicians 
Author-Name: Emmanuelle Auriol 
Author-Email:
Author-Name: Nicolas Bonneton
Author-Email:
Author-Name: Mattias Polborn
Author-Email:
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 

Abstract: This article studies the behavior of rational voters who, although aware of the limitations of populist leaders, 
consider supporting them strategically. We present a moral
hazard model of electoral accountability in which elite politicians are both office- and
policy-motivated and face the risk of being replaced by elite or populist candidates. The
optimal retention strategy depends on the policy implemented by the incumbent in the
previous period and its perceived success, and involves differentiated punishment for a
failing incumbent. Rational voters only vote for populists when the chosen policy is both
perceived as failure and as benefiting the elites. This challenges the simplistic view of
the populist vote as mere frustration with the elite.




Note: 
Length: 51
Creation-Date: 2023-11
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp473
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_473