Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Simple Allocation with Correlated Types
Author-Name: Axel Niemeyer
Author-Email: axel.niemeyer@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Justus Preusser
Author-Email: justus.preusser@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: D82
Keywords: Mechanism design without transfers, correlation, peer selection

Abstract: An object is allocated among a number of agents. The optimal allocation depends on the agents’ information about their peers, but each agent
wants the object for themself. Monetary transfers are unavailable. We consider mechanisms where it is a dominant strategy to report truthfully. We show
that deterministic mechanisms do not generally suffice for implementation and optimality, and that anonymous mechanisms cannot meaningfully elicit information. 
However, there are simple mechanisms—jury mechanisms—that are optimal when there are three or fewer agents, approximately optimal in symmetric environments with 
many agents, and the only deterministic mechanisms satisfying a relaxed anonymity notion. In a jury mechanism, each agent is either a juror or a candidate.
The jurors decide which candidate wins the object, but jurors never win.


Note: 
Length: 60
Creation-Date: 2023-12
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp486
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2023_486