Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Visibility of Technology and Cumulative Innovation: Evidence From Trade Secrets Laws
Author-Name: Bernhard Ganglmair
Author-Email: b.ganglmair@gmail.com
Author-Name: Imke Reimers
Author-Email: imke.reimers@cornell.edu

Classification-JEL: D80, O31, O34
Keywords: cumulative innovation; disclosure; intellectual property; Uniform Trade Secrets Act; visibility

Abstract: Innovation depends on the incentives to create new ideas as well as access to existing
ones. Access, in turn, depends on an initial invention's inherent visibility as well as the
inventor's decision to disclose it, for example through patenting. Compared to product
innovations, process innovations tend to be less visible, making secrecy as an intellectual
property strategy relatively more attractive; and stronger trade secrets protection laws
could hamper their disclosure even further. Using exogenous variation in the level of
trade secrets protection from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, we show that stronger
protection has a disproportionately negative effect on patenting of processes. We show
in simulations that these changes in disclosure can have large implications for follow-on
innovation and welfare.

Note: 
Length: 56
Creation-Date: 2021-05
Revision-Date: 2024-09
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp119
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2024_119v3