Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Auctions with Frictions: Recruitment, Entry, and Limited Commitment
Author-Name: Stephan Lauermann
Author-Email: s.lauermann@uni-bonn.de
Author-Name: Asher Wolinsky
Author-Email: a-wolinsky@northwestern.edu
Classification-JEL: D44
Keywords: Auctions

Abstract: Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price formation processes
that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as
bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations
on sellers commitment abilities. This paper develops an auction model that captures such frictions. We derive several novel predictions; in particular, we find that
outcomes are often inefficient, and the market sometimes unravels.

Note: 
Length: 51
Creation-Date: 2024-03
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp519
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2024_519