Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Screening for Breakthroughs
Author-Name: Gregorio Curello
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Ludvig Sinander
Author-Email: 

Classification-JEL: D82, D86
Keywords: Incentive design, delegation, verifiable evidence

Abstract: We identify a new dynamic agency problem: that of incentivising the
prompt disclosure of productive information. To study it, we introduce
a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an
uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal
must incentivise disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical
allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms:
they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a
graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the
design of unemployment insurance schemes.

Note: 
Length: 84
Creation-Date: 2024-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp562
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2024_562