Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: The Comparative Statics of Persuasion
Author-Name: Gregorio Curello
Author-Email: 
Author-Name: Ludvig Sinander
Author-Email: 

Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 

Abstract: In the canonical persuasion model, comparative statics has been an
open question. We answer it, delineating which shifts of the sender's
interim payoff lead her optimally to choose a more informative signal.
Our first theorem identifies a coarse notion of 'increased convexity' that
we show characterises those shifts of the senders interim payoff that
lead her optimally to choose no less informative signals. To strengthen
this conclusion to 'more informative' requires further assumptions:
our second theorem identifies the necessary and sufficient condition
on the sender's interim payoff, which strictly generalises the 'S' shape
commonly imposed in the literature. We identify conditions under which
increased alignment of interests between sender and receiver lead to
comparative statics, and study a number of applications.

Note: 
Length: 71
Creation-Date: 2024-06
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp564
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2024_564