Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title:Norms as Obligations
Author-Name: Leonard Hoeft
Author-Email: leonard.hoeft@hu-berlin.de
Author-Name: Michael Kurschilgen
Author-Email: michael.kurschilgen@unidistance.ch
Author-Name: Wladislaw Mill
Author-Email: mill@uni-mannheim.de

Classification-JEL: C91, D63, D81, D83, K10
Keywords: Norms, Information, Authority, Willful Ignorance, Dictator Game, Legal Theory, Experi-
ment

Abstract: Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the
consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non‐monetary) considerations.
Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that the normative side of law is central. Citizens
comply because they have an obligation to do so. Legal norms provide exclusionary reasons that
prevent weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online
experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable
payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our
experimental results show that ‐‐ in the presence of a norm ‐‐ participants follow norms without
searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is
independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model
of norm compliance.


Note: 
Length: 24
Creation-Date: 2024-11
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp610
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2024_610