Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Optimal Allocations with Capacity Constrained Verification
Author-Name: Albin Erlanson
Author-Email: albin.erlanson@essex.ac.uk
Author-Name: Andreas Kleiner
Author-Email: andreas.kleiner@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: D82, D71
Keywords: Mechanism Design with Evidence; Allocations; Verification

Abstract: A principal has m identical objects to allocate among a group of n agents. Objects
are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the
agent's private information. The principal can verify up to k agents, where k<m,
thereby perfectly learning the types of those verified. We find the mechanism that
maximizes the principal's expected utility when no monetary transfers are available.
In this mechanism, an agent receives an object if (i) his type is above a cutoff and
among the m highest types, (ii) his type is above some lower cutoff but among the k
highest types, or (iii) he receives an object in a lottery that allocates the remaining
objects randomly.

Note: 
Length: 35
Creation-Date: 2025-01
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp630
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_630