Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: From Design to Disclosure
Author-Name: S. Nageeb Ali
Author-Email: nageeb@psu.edu
Author-Name: Andreas Kleiner
Author-Email: andykleiner@gmail.com
Author-Name: Kun Zhang
Author-Email: kun@kunzhang.org

Classification-JEL: D82
Keywords: voluntary disclosure, evidence games

Abstract: This paper studies games of voluntary disclosure in which a sender discloses evidence
to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. We characterize the set of
equilibrium payoffs in this setting. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile
that can be achieved through information design can also be supported by an equilibrium
of the disclosure game. Hence, our analysis suggests an equivalence between disclosure
and design in these settings. We apply our results to monopoly pricing, bargaining over
policies, and insurance markets.

Note: 
Length: 36
Creation-Date: 2025-01
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp632
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_632