Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: A Theory of Auditability for Allocation Mechanisms
Author-Name: Aram Grigoryan
Author-Email:ag@ucsd.edu
Author-Name: Markus Möller
Author-Email: mmoelle2@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C78, D47, D82
Keywords: Matching and Allocation, Auditability, Deviation Detection, 

In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised
mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty that captures how easy or hard it is to detect deviations from a
mechanism. We find a stark contrast between the auditabilities of prominent mechanisms. We also provide tight characterizations of maximally auditable classes
of allocation mechanisms.

Note: 
Length: 101
Creation-Date: 2025-02
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp652
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_652