Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements
Author-Name: Aram Grigoryan
Author-Email:a2grigoryan@ucsd.edu
Author-Name: Markus Möller
Author-Email: mmoelle2@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C78, D47, D82
Keywords: Allocation Problems, Robust Market Design, Opaque Announcements, Strategy-Proofness, Transparency

We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one
outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable properties can be ensured under opacity in a robust sense. A property can be
guaranteed under an opaque announcement if every mechanism compatible with it satisfies the property. We find an impossibility result: strategy-proofness
cannot be guaranteed under any level of opacity. In contrast, in some environments, weak Maskin monotonicity and non-bossiness can be guaranteed under
opacity.

Note: 
Length: 15
Creation-Date: 2025-02
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp653
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_653