Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Transparent Matching Mechanisms
Author-Name: Markus Möller
Author-Email: mmoelle2@uni-bonn.de

Classification-JEL: C78, D47, D82
Keywords: Matching, Transparency, Strategy-Proof, Stability, Efficiency

Abstract: In a standard one-to-one agent-object matching model, I consider a central matching authority that publicly announces a strategy-proof mechanism
and then initiates a matching. Following Akbarpour and Li (2020), the authority's commitment to the announced mechanism is limited to
mechanisms rendering participants' observations indistinguishable from it. I call an announced mechanism transparent if any deviation from it
would be detected. The main findings identify trade-offs regarding transparency and other desirable properties: Under stability or efficiency,
strategy-proof mechanisms are transparent if and only if they are dictatorial. However, at the same time, the agent-proposing Deferred Acceptance
(DA) mechanism is tantamount to commiting to stability, while efficient mechanisms often fail to commit to efficiency. This transparency trade-off
between stability and efficiency persists when strategy-proofness is guaranteed.

Note: 
Length: 28
Creation-Date: 2025-03
Revision-Date:
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp666
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_666