Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes
Author-Name: Francesc Dilmé
Author-Email: fdilme@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, C73
Keywords: Justfiable equilibira, sequentially stable outcomes

Abstract: An equilibrium outcome of a game in extensive form is fully self-justifiable if it is supported by
justifiable equilibria (McLennan, 1985) regardless of the order in which actions implausible
under the given outcome are excluded. We show that the set of fully self-justifiable outcomes
is non-empty and contains the set of sequentially stable outcomes (Dilmé, 2024). In signaling
games, fully self-justifiable outcomes pass all the selection criteria in Cho and Kreps (1987).
Full self-justifiability allows for the systematic use of the logic of selection criteria in signaling
games to select equilibria in any finite extensive form game.


Note: 
Length: 45
Creation-Date: 2025-10
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp702
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_702