Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Sequential Equilibria in Mixed Strategies
Author-Name: Francesc Dilmé
Author-Email: fdilme@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, C73
Keywords: Sequential equilibria, mixed strategies, purification

Abstract: A Nash equilibrium of a game in extensive form is a sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies if it can be approximated through equilibria of close-by games
with slightly perturbed payoffs and small-probability behavioral types. We show that sequential equilibria in mixed strategies are equivalent to (i) weakly
sequential equilibria (Reny, 1992), (ii) normal-form perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) in games with generic payoffs, and (iii) purifiable Nash equilibria (Harsanyi,
1973). A corollary of our results is that extensive-form perfect equilibria are normal-form perfect equilibria in games with generic payoffs.


Note: 
Length: 37
Creation-Date: 2025-10
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp703
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_703