Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Title: Simultaneous Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions
Author-Name: Silvio Sorbera
Author-Email: silvio.sorbera@uni-bonn.de
Classification-JEL: C72, D44

Keywords:  Simultaneous bidding, concurrent auctions, sealed-bid auctions, first-price
auction, second-price auction

Abstract: In this paper, we analyze a model of competing sealed-bid first-price and second-price auctions where bidders have unit demand and can bid on
multiple auctions simultaneously. We show that there is no symmetric pure equilibrium with strategies that are increasing in the lowest type, unlike
in standard auction games. However, for a two-player game a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and bidders place bids on all available
auctions with probability one. This holds true for any mixed equilibrium and for any number of bidders. We then solve the case of two auctions and
two bidders. Analyzing the case of binary type space, we are able to identify mixed strategy equilibria and analyze the consequences of discrete bid
spaces.
Note: 
Length: 45
Creation-Date: 2025-11
Revision-Date: 
File-URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp713
File-Format: application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:CRCTR224_2025_713